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Abstract
Analyzing and Defending Against Evolving Web Threats
Alexandros Kapravelos
The browser has evolved from a simple program that displays static web pages into a
continuously-changing platform that is shaping the Internet as we know it today. The fierce
competition among browser vendors has led to the introduction of a plethora of features
in the past few years. At the same time, it remains the de facto way to access the Internet
for billions of users. Because of such rapid evolution and wide popularity, the browser has
attracted attackers, who pose new threats to unsuspecting Internet surfers.
In this dissertation, I present my work on securing the browser against current and
emerging threats. First, I discuss my work on honeyclients, which are tools that identify
malicious pages that compromise the browser, and how one can evade such systems. Then, I
describe a new system that I built, called Revolver, that automatically tracks the evolution of
JavaScript and is capable of identifying evasive web-based malware by finding similarities
in JavaScript samples with different classifications. Finally, I present Hulk, a system that
automatically analyzes and classifies browser extensions.
viii
Contents
Acknowledgements iv
Curriculum Vitæ vi
Abstract viii
List of Figures xii
List of Tables xiv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Drive-by Downloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Browser Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Related Work 12
2.1 Evading High-interaction Honeyclients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Detecting Evasive Web-based Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Analyzing Browser Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Evading High-Interaction Honeyclients 22
3.1 Honeyclients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1.1 Security requirements for high-interaction honeyclients . . . . 25
3.1.2 Design choices for high-interaction honeyclients . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.3 Honeyclients in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Attacks Against Honeyclients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Fingerprinting the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.2 Evading detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
ix
3.2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Attacks in the Real World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4.1 Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.2 Protection of the monitoring system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4 An Automated Approach to the Detection of Evasive Web-based Malware 54
4.1 Background and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.1 Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.2 Abstract Syntax Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.3 Similarity Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.4 Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2.5 Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.1 Evasions in the wild . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.2 Evasions case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5 Eliciting Malicious Behavior in Browser Extensions 97
5.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.1.1 Chrome Extension Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.1.2 Installing Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.1.3 Extension Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2.1 Profiling Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2.2 Event-Based Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2.3 Detecting Malicious Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.4 Injected Content Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3.1 Permissions Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3.2 Network Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.3 Extensions Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3.4 Code Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4 Profiting from Maliciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.4.1 Ad Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4.2 Affiliate Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
x
5.4.3 Information Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.4 OSN Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.6 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6 Conclusions and Future Work 140
Bibliography 142
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Control panel of an exploit kit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Malicious code interaction with the Honeyclient system. . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Capture-HPC Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Detecting Capture-HPC presence in the file system with JavaScript. . . 34
3.4 Function hooks detection: before calling a critical function, we check if it
is hooked. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Browser cache poisoning attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 In-memory keylogger: collects keystrokes and sends them to the attacker
with HTTP GET requests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.7 Confuse honeyclient: find an Internet Explorer instance and force it to visit
a URL of our choice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Malicious code that sets up a shellcode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 An evasion using non-existent ActiveX controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 Architecture of Revolver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Data structures used by Revolver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Number of detected similarities as a function of the distance threshold. . 82
4.6 The resulting amount of similarities for different similarity thresholds. . 82
4.7 Evasion based on differences in the scope handling insideeval in different
JavaScript engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.8 Timeline of PDF evasions automatically detected by Revolver. . . . . . 88
4.9 Evasion based on the ability to access the eval function as a property of
native objects in Adobe’s JavaScript engine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.10 Evasion based on PDF specific objects app and target. . . . . . . . . . 89
4.11 An evasion taking advantage of a subtle bug in Wepawet’s JavaScript
engine in order to protect the XOR key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
xii
5.1 Example of a manifest that shows API permissions for two hosts, followed
by content scripts that run on http://www.yahoo.com, followed by a
background script that runs on all pages. Finally, the CSP specifies the ability to
include and eval scripts in the extension from foo.com. . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2 Permission-related JSON from the manifest file of an extension performing
ad replacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.3 Permissions and content script excerpts from the manifest for an extension
that spams on Facebook and creates Tumblr accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
xiii
List of Tables
3.1 Summary of the attacks: a 7 indicates that the attack did not evade the
honeyclient, a3 indicates that the attack was not detected. . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Capture-HPC and Wepawet analysis results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Possible JavaScript evasion techniques against Capture-HPC found in the
wild. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 Candidate pairs classification (B is a benign sequence,M is a malicious
sequence, ∗ indicates a wildcard value). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Benign scripts from Wepawet that have similarities with malicious scripts
and their classification from Revolver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 Classification distribution of extensions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2 Distribution of detected suspicious/malicious behavior from analyzed
extensions. Notice that an extension might have more than one detections and
that we mark with [m] detections classified as malicious and with [s] detections
classified as suspicious. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3 The top 10 permissions found in the manifest files for all extensions we ran.
Extensions can include more than one permission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4 The top 25 host permissions used by extensions. Extensions can include
more than one host permission per manifest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5 The top 25 hosts used in extensions’ content script permissions. . . . . 138
5.6 The top 15 chrome.* APIs called by extensions during dynamic analysis. 139
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
Today the Internet plays an essential part in the lives of billions of people, who use the
Internet to find information, to communicate, or for entertainment. The browser has become
our portal to the Internet and it is so significant to our daily operations that it is coming
pre-installed in every modern operating system. Over the past two decades, the browser has
evolved significantly and it is the main element that drives innovation on the web. It even
affects our lives outside of the digital world, as many corporations use the browser as their
main platform to do business online, changing traditional business models that have lasted
for centuries.
With such an important role it was inevitable that miscreants would quickly get interested
in attacking the browser. There are three main reasons that make the browser attractive for
attackers: evolution, input, and connectivity. The browser is a unique piece of software that
evolves constantly. For example, Google’s browser Chrome has a new version released
every 6 weeks [36]. The input to the browser comes from its user in the form of a URL,
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which indicates the page that the user wants to visit. But to display that page, the browser
fetches third-party code that gets rendered locally, allowing this way the site developer to
manipulate the browser. More importantly, this happens over a network, which means that
the browser is not isolated on a disconnected machine, rather it is accessible via a network.
This gives attackers a great platform to abuse in many different ways, especially because it is
possible to profit from exploiting the browser and collecting valuable personal information.
In this dissertation I present my work on understanding in depth attacks that target the
browser and on building defenses to protect the users. I focus on two specific types of
attacks: drive-by downloads and malicious browser extensions. Drive-by downloads are
attacks that exploit a vulnerability in the browser or its plugins and gain full control of the
system by hijacking the browser’s execution flow. It is a way for the attacker to introduce
new binary code into the user’s system and compromise its security. Browser extensions are
small JavaScript/HTML programs that reside inside the browser and are limited in power.
Nevertheless, since browser extensions are capable of manipulating the browser and the
pages that the user visits, they are an effective tool to steal personal information and perform
other attacks.
2
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1.1 Drive-by Downloads
Drive-by downloads have troubled both the academic community and the browser vendors
for more than a decade. They have been very successful, because the user does not need to
interact with them in any way: the user just needs to visit a page containing malicious code
to get infected. Because most people browse the web by clicking on any link that draws their
interest, it is not easy to avoid such pages, and, eventually, the browser is silently attacked.
There are three ways to deliver a drive-by download to an unsuspecting user. A drive-by
download can be hosted on a web server controlled by the attacker. To lure users to their
malicious sites, the attackers can promote their malicious links in many ways. For example,
links to malicious pages can be distributed leveraging social networks, by posting links in
the trending topics. Another way to attract users to malicious pages is by sending emails that
entice the user to click on the link. Malicious pages can also be returned in search results
because the attacker creates carefully crafted (and optimized) web pages that appear to be
related to very common, trending terms (this type of activity is also known as Black Hat
Search Engine Optimization, or Black Hat SEO).
Another way to deliver drive-by downloads is to compromise an already existing website
and infect the page’s source code. This requires the attacker to compromise the security of
the website by finding a vulnerability that allows the attacker to inject new or modify existing
web content. Once the site has been compromised, any user who visits the previously-benign
3
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website can be targeted by a drive-by download. While cleaning up a compromised site
is not difficult, finding and removing the underlying vulnerability can be challenging. If
the vulnerability is not removed, it allows the attacker to re-infect the vulnerable website.
Another benefit that comes to the attacker when he/she compromises an existing website is
that the domain that is now hosting malicious code has a previously good reputation, and,
therefore, it is less likely that the site will get blacklisted by software that protects against
drive-by downloads using reputation metadata. In addition, the attacker does not need to
attract users to the site, as the site has its own regular visitors.
Finally, one can serve drive-by downloads by taking advantage of the openness of the web.
A website has several external dependencies, such as script and iframe inclusions. These are
components of the site that load third-party code to enhance the browsing experience or to
monetize through advertisements. An attacker can either compromise the site that is hosting
the third-party code or register a malicious advertisement that ends up being served from a
benign website. These attacks are interesting because they do not rely on the security of
the website that the user is visiting but rather on the security of the dependencies that the
website has.
Anatomy of Drive-by Downloads. An attack against the browser starts once the
unsuspecting user visits a site containing malicious code. At that point, the specially crafted
page targets several vulnerabilities against the browser and its plugins. The first step of the
attack is to determine if the current browser configuration is vulnerable. If the software is
4
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found to be vulnerable, then the malicious code will try to exploit the detected vulnerability.
These are often memory corruption bugs, such as buffer overflows or use-after-free flaws.
The attacker is able to hijack the execution flow of the browser by first introducing additional
executable code in the memory, for example through a JavaScript string variable, and then
using a vulnerability to direct the execution there. The new code segment that is injected in
the browser by the attacker is called shellcode, and, in drive-by downloads, it is used as the
first stage of the attack. Its role is to infect the victim’s machine with malware, persistently
compromising the system. The types of malware and what happens after the system is
compromised is out of the scope of this dissertation, as we focus on how a browser can be
compromised.
Exploit Kits. With such diverse population of Internet users, a malicious page needs
to support multiple client configurations in order to compromise a significant amount of
victims. For example, as of March 2015, there are still 1% of Internet users that have Internet
Explorer 6 [1], a Microsoft browser that was released in 2001 and was deprecated in 2011 [2].
This diversity of vulnerable targets leads to an interesting evolution of drive-by downloads
with the rise of tools that offer multiple attacks as a service, namely exploit kits. These
tools abstract the hard work of incorporating multiple exploits for several browsers or its
plugins and also hosting the malicious code on web servers. They come with a control
panel, as shown in Figure 1.1, where the customer can see statistics about its victims and
configure various parameters of the exploit kit. This configuration involves distributing
5
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Figure 1.1: Control panel of an exploit kit.
customized malware, often checked by the exploit kit to verify that it does not get detected
by any antivirus software. This evolution of providing drive-by downloads as a service
resulted in the commercialization of such attacks, where a novice attacker can deploy
sophisticated browser attacks without any knowledge on how to write an exploit targeting a
browser. Malwarebytes reports that two thirds of new malware they observe originates from
exploit kits [63], which underlines the importance of understanding such attacks and finding
effective ways to mitigate them.
Defenses. Analyzing a web page to determine if it contains malicious code that will
perform a drive-by download attack is not a trivial task. The attackers are deliberately crafting
the page in such a way so that their attack is not easily detectable. The malicious code is
often not directly located in the original page, but it is obfuscated and dynamically generated
6
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as the browser renders the page. This means that by observing the web page statically or as it
appears on the network, it is very hard to determine if it is malicious or not. In order to have
the full picture and all components of the page, an analysis system has to dynamically render
the page, so that all generated code is revealed. To do this, researchers have designed and
developed honeyclients, specially-crafted browsers that provide detailed information about
the actions performed by the code in a web page when it is rendered in the browser, and the
honeyclients are able to determine if the web page is malicious. Honeyclients are split into
two basic categories: high-interaction and low-interaction honeyclients.
High-interaction honeyclients resemble as much as they can a real client visiting web
pages. They use a real browser running on an operating system exactly as a user would, but
the system is enhanced so that it can detect any changes that are happening. By inspecting
the state of the system, high-interaction honeyclients can infer an infection by observing any
changes to the system, like unknown processes that are spawned after visiting a web page, or
by changes in the registry and the filesystem [70, 71, 81, 99, 106].
Part of this dissertation focuses on understanding the limitations of honeyclients. As
discussed in Chapter 3, there are several ways in which an attacker might be able to evade
a high-interaction honeyclient so that his/her attacks remain unnoticed. For example, the
attacker can choose to perform an in-memory attack, sacrificing persistence on the victim’s
system in favor of stealthiness. In fact, the Angler exploit kit has already demonstrated such
capabilities in 2014 [64].
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Low-interaction honeyclients are tools that provide deeper insight into what is happening
when a browser visits a web page. This can be achieved by emulating part or the whole
functionality of a browser, which gives significant flexibility into exporting enough infor-
mation from a page visit so that the system can accurately identify a drive-by download.
For example, an emulated browser could export all JavaScript variables, so that they can
be analyzed to detect the presence of binary code, something that should be encountered
only in a drive-by download. One significant drawback of low-interaction honeyclients is
the fact that they might diverge too much from a real browser. In fact, through our work
we found samples in the wild that take advantage specifically of the fact that their attack
code is being analyzed. In such cases, the samples were not identified correctly as malicious,
as the attack was never launched after detecting the presence of an analysis system. To
cope with this problem, we have developed a system called Revolver that is able to track the
evolution of JavaScript found in web pages. As further discussed in Chapter 5, by using
the classification results from an oracle and the similarity between scripts, we are able to
identify automatically evasive drive-by downloads.
1.2 Browser Extensions
We spend increasingly more time using browsers in our daily lives to perform sensitive
tasks such as banking, authoring documents, accessing our medical records, and interacting
8
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socially. Modern browsers support modification through extensions to make a user’s
interaction with the web easier, customizable, and to enable richer content. Browser
extensions are small JavaScript/HTML programs that reside inside the browser and have
access to a privileged browser API compared to websites. Through an extension the user
can change not only how a website appears, but also enhance the browsing experience with
additional client-side functionality. For example, one of the most popular extensions is
AdBlock, an extension that has a blacklist of domains and URL patterns of advertising
companies, and when browsing the web it removes the components of the visited pages
that match the blacklist, resulting in an ad-free browsing experience. The extensions do not
have unrestricted access to every page that the user is visiting, but in every browser there is
a permission model that they need to comply with. Similar to what happens with mobile
application stores, browser vendors maintain and control the available extensions through
extension stores, like Chrome’s Web Store.
Recently, we have encountered a shift in the attackers’ interests towards extensions, which
seems to be for practical and economical reasons: extensions are easy to write, as they
require less skill than writing a drive-by download. At the same time, they are very profitable,
as they can control the browser and the pages that the user is visiting. Interestingly, we have
seen users infected with malware where the malicious binary was side-loading a malicious
extension in the browser, because, by doing this, it is easier to manipulate the user’s browsing
experience. We have also found extensions installed by millions of users that performed
9
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malicious activities resulting in millions of US dollars in revenue for the extension authors.
Through the use of browser extensions, the attackers are able to perform malicious activities
without an exploit and gain access to powerful APIs and data available through the browser
extension platform. Malicious extensions can intercept HTTP requests, as well as modify
the functionality and appearance of all web content, which makes them very dangerous
when used by miscreants. To understand and mitigate this new threat against the browser,
we built a system called Hulk, presented in Chapter 5, that uses dynamic analysis techniques
to analyze browser extensions and identify those containing malicious functionality.
1.3 Contributions
In this dissertation, I make the following contributions to securing the browser:
• I study how high-interaction honeyclients work and identify major design flaws in how
drive-by downloads are currently detected. Several attacks that evade detection in four
popular high-interaction honeyclients were implemented.
• I built a system, called Revolver, that tracks the evolution of JavaScript. By leveraging
clustering and program analysis techniques applied to millions of JavaScript files, we are
able to automatically pinpoint previously-unknown evasion attacks.
• I built a system, called Hulk, that analyzes browser extensions and identifies malicious
ones. Our system is able to elicit malicious behavior from the browser extension by using
10
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novel techniques, such as HoneyPages and event handler fuzzing. Our work resulted in
removing extensions from Google’s Web Store that were affecting millions of users.
11
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Related Work
Drive-by downloads and the security implications of browser extensions have been
extensively studied in the literature. In this chapter, we will focus specifically on systems
that analyze attacks against the browser and how they can be evaded, how such evasive
web-based malware can be detected and what research has been done regarding browser
extensions.
2.1 Evading High-interaction Honeyclients
Our work is mainly related to the problems of identifying weaknesses in the defensive
systems designed to monitor and detect the execution of malicious programs, and of devising
attacks against them. Here, we will review the current state-of-the-art in these areas, focusing
in particular on systems that detect web-based and binary malware and on intrusion detection
tools.
12
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Web-based malware monitors. Attacks against high-interaction honeyclients have
been previously discussed. In particular, Wang et al. discuss three avenues to evade their
HoneyMonkey system [106]: (i) identifying HoneyMonkey machines (based on detecting
their IP addresses, by testing whether the browser is driven by a human, or by identifying the
presence of a virtual machine or the HoneyMonkey code itself); (ii) running exploits that do
not trigger HoneyMonkey’s detection (e.g., by using time delays); and (iii) randomizing the
attack (trading off infection rates for detection rates).
We build on and extend this research in several ways. First, we have implemented the
aforementioned attacks and confirmed that they are (still) effective against all current,
publicly-available honeyclient systems. Second, we introduce and discuss in detail novel
attacks against high-interaction honeyclients, with the goal of providing simple and practical
implementations. Finally, we discuss the design trade-offs of these attacks. For example,
we show how to detect the presence of a honeyclient from a page’s JavaScript and from an
exploit’s shellcode. JavaScript-based attacks have more limited capability because they are
restricted by the JavaScript security model (e.g., they cannot be used to detect hooks in the
memory of a process), but they are more difficult to detect by current honeyclients, because
they do not cause any changes on the attacked system (e.g., no new file is created and no
exploit is launched).
We also note that Wang’s paper concludes its discussion of possible countermeasures
by introducing the Vulnerability-Specific Exploit Detector (VSED), a tool that checks the
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browser with vulnerability-specific predicates to determine when an attack is about to trigger
a vulnerability. VSED presents a significant deviation from the traditional state-change-
based approach for detecting drive-by-download attacks. In fact, while state-change-based
approaches focus on detecting the consequences of a successful drive-by-download, VSED
attempts to detect the actual exploitation.
Some of the attacks identified in [106] have become standard in several drive-by-download
toolkits. In particular, it is common for these kits to launch an attack only once per visiting
client IP [82], to only attack clients coming from specific geographic regions (determined on
the basis of GeoIP location data) [13], and to avoid attacking IPs known to belong to security
researchers and security companies [42]. Another attack against detection tools used by
some drive-by-download campaigns consists of waiting for some minimal user interaction
before launching the exploit. For example, the JavaScript code used by Mebroot triggers
only when the user clicks on a page’s link or releases the mouse anywhere on the page.
Malware sandboxes. Binary malware is a significant security threat, and, consequently,
a large body of work exists to analyze and detect malicious code. Currently, the most
popular approach for malware analysis relies on dynamic analysis systems, often called
sandboxing [6,11,21,46,78,100]. A sandbox is an instrumented execution environment that
runs a potentially malicious program, while monitoring its interactions with the operating
system and other hosts. Similar to honeyclients, malware sandboxes execute unknown code
and determine its maliciousness based on the analysis of its behavior.
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Since system emulators and virtual machines are commonly employed to implement
sandboxes, malware authors have developed a number of techniques to identify them (and,
in turn, avoid the detection of the monitoring system). For example, a number of instructions
have been identified that behave differently on a virtualized or emulated environment
than on a real machine [29, 65, 79, 85, 94]. This has led researchers to design monitoring
systems that are transparent to malware checks (i.e., that cannot be easily distinguished
from regular hosts), by either removing artifacts of regular monitoring tools [59] or by
introducing mechanisms (such as virtualization and dynamic translation) that by design
remain transparent to a wider range of checks [23, 103].
Another class of attacks against a malware sandbox consists of detecting, disabling, or
otherwise subverting its monitoring facilities. These threats have prompted researchers to
experiment with new designs for monitoring systems, in which the monitoring components
are protected by isolating them from the untrusted monitored environment through hardware
memory protection and virtualization features (“in-VM” designs) [97] or by removing them
from the monitored environment (“out-of-VM” designs) [45].
In this dissertation we dissect the monitoring and isolation mechanisms employed in
high-interaction honeyclients. As we will see in Chapter 3, many of the approaches currently
used are vulnerable to attacks similar to those devised against malware monitoring systems.
Intrusion detection systems. Our work continues the line of research on attacking tools
designed to detect malicious activity, in particular, intrusion detection systems (IDSs). A
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few notable results include Ptacek and Newsham’s attacks against network IDSs [83], Fogla
and Lee’s evasion attacks against anomaly-based IDSs [31], Vigna et al.’s approach to evade
signature-based IDSs [104], and Van Gundy et al.’s “omission” attack against signature
generation tools for polymorphic worms [102]. Our research identifies high-interaction
honeyclients as a new, important target for offensive techniques, and shows weaknesses in
several popular implementations.
2.2 Detecting Evasive Web-based Malware
Detection of evasive code. The detection of code that behaves differently when run in an
analysis environment than when executed on a regular machine is a well-known problem in
the binary malware community. A number of techniques have been developed to check if a
binary is running inside an emulator or a virtual machine [29,85,94]. In this context, evasive
code consists of instructions that produce different results or side-effects on an emulator
and on a real host [66, 79]. The original malware code is modified to run these checks: if
the check identifies an analysis system, the code behaves in a benign way, thus evading
detection.
Researchers have dealt with such evasive checks in two ways. First, they have designed
systems that remain transparent to a wide range of malware checks [24, 103]. Second, they
have developed techniques to detect the presence of such checks, for example by comparing
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the behavior of a sample on a reference machine with that obtained by running it on an
analysis host [8, 47, 58].
Similar to the case of evasions against binary analysis environments, the results produced
by honeyclients (i.e., the classification of a web page as either malicious or benign) can be
confused by sufficiently-sophisticated evasion techniques. Honeyclients are not perfect and
attackers have found ways to evade them [48, 86, 106]. For example, malicious web pages
may be designed to launch an exploit only after they have verified that the current visitor
is a regular user, rather than an automated detection tool. A web page may check that the
visitor performs some activity, such as moving the mouse or clicking on links, or that the
browser possesses the idiosyncratic properties of commonly-used modern browsers, rather
than being a simple emulator. If any of these checks are not satisfied, the malicious web page
will refrain from launching the attack, and, as a consequence, will be incorrectly classified as
benign, thus evading detection.
The problem of evasive code in web attacks has only recently been investigated. Kolbitsch
et al. [52] have studied the “fragility” of malicious code, i.e., its dependence for correct
execution on the presence of a particular execution environment (e.g., specific browser and
plugin versions). They report several techniques used by malicious code for environment
matching: some of these techniques may well be used to distinguish analysis tools from
regular browsers and evade detection. They propose ROZZLE, a system that explores multi-
ple execution paths in a program, thus bypassing environment checks. Rozzle only detects
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fingerprinting that leverages control flow branches and depends upon the environment.
It can be evaded by techniques that do not need control-flow branches, e.g., those based
on browser or JavaScript quirks. For example, the property window.innerWidth
contains the width of the browser window viewport in Firefox and Chrome, and is un-
defined in Internet Explorer. Therefore, a malicious code that initialized a decoding key
as xorkey=window.innerWidth*0+3 would compute a different result for xorkey in Fire-
fox/Chrome (3) and IE (Not a Number error), and could be used to decode malicious code in
specific browsers. Rozzle will not trigger its multi-path techniques in such cases and can be
evaded.
Revolver takes a different approach to identifying evasive code in JavaScript programs.
Instead of forcing an evasive program to display its full behavior (by executing it in parallel
on a reference host and in an analysis environment [8], or by forcing the execution through
multiple, interesting paths [52]), it leverages the existence of two distinct but similar pieces
of code and the fact that, despite their similarity, they are classified differently by detection
tools. In addition, Revolver can precisely and automatically identify the code responsible for
an evasion.
JavaScript code analysis. In the last few years, there have been a number of approaches
to analyzing JavaScript code. For example, Prophiler [14] and ZOZZLE [19] have used
characteristics of JavaScript code to predict if a script is malicious or benign. ZOZZLE, in
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particular, leverages features associated with AST context information (such as, the presence
of a variable named scode in the context of a loop), for its classification.
Cujo [91] uses static and dynamic code features to identify malicious JavaScript programs.
More precisely, it processes the static program and traces of its execution into q-grams that
are classified using machine learning techniques.
Revolver performs the core of its analysis statically, by computing the similarity between
pairs of ASTs. However, Revolver also relies on dynamic analysis, in particular to obtain
access to the code generated dynamically by a script (e.g., via the eval() function), which
is a common technique used by obfuscated and malicious code.
Code similarity. The task of automatically detecting “clones,” i.e., segments of code that
are similar (according to some notion of similarity), is an established line of work in the
software engineering community [80, 93]. Unfortunately, many of the techniques developed
here assume that the code under analysis is well-behaved or at least not adversarial, that is,
not actively trying to elude the classification. Of course, this assumption does not hold when
examining malicious code.
Similarity between malicious binaries has been used to quickly identify different variants
of the same malware family. The main challenge in this context is dealing with extremely
large numbers of samples without source code and large feature spaces from runtime data.
Different techniques have been proposed to overcome these issues: for example, Bayer et
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al. [10] rely on locality sensitive hashing to reduce the number of items to compare, while
Jong et al. [44] use feature hashing to reduce the number of features.
As a comparison, Revolver aims not only to identify pieces of JavaScript code that
are similar, but also to understand why they differ and especially if these differences are
responsible for changing the classification of the sample.
2.3 Analyzing Browser Extensions
Browser extensions have been available for Internet Explorer and Firefox for over a decade.
As a result of a study of vulnerabilities in Firefox extensions, Barth et al. designed an
extension architecture that promotes least privilege and isolation of components to prevent a
compromised extension from gaining full access to a user’s browser [9], an architecture
subsequently adopted by Google Chrome. Since then, further work has examined the success
of the Chrome extension architecture at preventing damage [15] and the ability of developers
to correctly request privileges for their extensions [28]. Similar studies have examined the
Firefox extension system to limit the potential damage arising from exploitation of extension
vulnerabilities, and to improve the defenses the browser provides [98]. These works have a
focus mostly tangential to our work, since the principle of least privilege does not prevent an
overtly malicious extension from executing malicious code.
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The security industry has documented malicious extensions in ways similar to malware
reports and other new threats [4, 7]. Liu et al. examined Google Chrome extensions and,
based on malicious extensions the authors built, suggested refined privileges to make
detecting malicious extensions easier [60]. In our work, we build a system that performs
dynamic analysis and classification of extensions and present an analysis of malicious
extensions that we found in the wild.
JavaScript-based program analysis has particular promise for benefiting our work, and
in light of our current limitations we will be exploring techniques that we can adapt to
improve our system’s detection capabilities. Research has applied information flow analysis
to Firefox extensions [22], performed taint-based tracking of untrusted data within the
browser [25], used symbolic execution to detect vulnerabilities [95], applied static verifica-
tion to extensions [40], contained extensions in privacy-preserving environments [57], and
used supervised learning of browser memory profiles to detect privacy-sensitive events [35].
Our work has similarities to that of other malware detection and execution systems.
While our implementation and requirements significantly differ from systems that execute
Windows binary malware (such as Anubis [6]), at a high level we share common goals of
executing and extracting data from samples. Like Anubis, Wepawet, the GQ honeyfarm, and
other malware execution platforms, we share the difficult problem of triggering malicious
behavior in a synthetic environment [18, 55]. Other research in this area have focused on
classification and discerning malware from goodware [87].
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Evading High-Interaction Honeyclients
First,we examine the security model that high-interaction honeyclients use and evaluate
their weaknesses in practice. By analyzing in depth how these analysis systems work we
show in this chapter multiple ways that a miscreant can use to craft evasive attacks and avoid
detection.
Drive-by-download attacks are one of the most pervasive threats on the web, and past
measurements have found millions of malicious web pages [12, 81]. In addition, studies
have shown that a large portion of the online population uses software that is vulnerable to
the exploits used in drive-by-download attacks [32].
A primary line of defense against drive-by-download attacks consists of detecting web
pages that perform such attacks and publishing their addresses on blacklists. Then, browsers
can consult these blacklists and block requests to pages that are known to be malicious. This
mechanism is currently used in all major browsers, typically by querying Google’s Safe
Browsing API or Microsoft’s SmartScreen Filter [37, 67].
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The approach used in high-interaction honeyclients focuses on detecting the side-effects
of a successful exploit (i.e., the changes to the underlying system), rather than detecting the
exploit itself, an approach that some refer to as detection” [106]. While this approach has
merits (e.g., it provides very convincing evidence of the maliciousness of a detected page), it
also creates an opportunity to attack the detection system. More precisely, an attacker can
use the window between the launching of an exploit and the execution of its actual drive-by
component (whose effects are detected by a high-interaction honeyclients) to attack and
evade the honeyclient.
In this chapter, the security model of high-interaction honeyclients is put under the
microscope and its weaknesses are evaluated in practice. More precisely, we first review
high-interaction honeyclients in general, discussing different possible designs and their
security properties. We then introduce a number of possible attacks that leverage weaknesses
in the design of high-interaction honeyclients to evade their detection. Finally, we implement
these attacks and test them against four popular, well-known implementations of high-
interaction honeyclients. Our attacks allow malicious web pages to avoid being detected
by a high-interaction honeyclient, while continuing to be effective against regular visitors.
Some of these attacks have been previously described; nevertheless, we show concrete
implementations that successfully bypass well-known, commonly-used honeyclient tools.
In addition, we introduce three novel honeyclient attacks (JavaScript-based honeyclient
detection, in-memory execution, whitelist-based attacks) that enable us to detect the presence
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of a high-interaction honeyclient or to perform a drive-by-download without triggering the
honeyclient’s detection mechanisms.
We also note that it is relatively easy to retrofit existing drive-by-download toolkits
with the evasion techniques that we present here. This makes their impact even more
worrisome, and it increases the urgency for implementing adequate defensive mechanisms
in high-interaction honeyclients.
3.1 Honeyclients
High-interaction honeyclients use a full-featured web browser to visit potentially malicious
web pages. The environment in which the browser runs is monitored to determine if the
visit resulted in the system being compromised. In particular, the honeyclient records all
the modifications that occur during the visit of a page, such as files created or deleted,
registry keys modified, and processes launched. If any unexpected modification occurs, this
is considered as the manifestation of an attack, and the corresponding page is flagged as
malicious.
In this section, we first describe the security requirements for honeyclients. Then,
we discuss the key design choices in the development of honeyclients, and we conclude
examining in detail a specific honeyclient implementation.
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Figure 3.1: Malicious code interaction with the Honeyclient system.
3.1.1 Security requirements for high-interaction honeyclients
An ideal honeyclient system would be capable of detecting all the malicious web pages
that it visits. There are three general reasons that may cause a missed detection: 1) the
honeyclient is not exploitable, thus the attack performed by the malicious web page is not
successful; 2) the honeyclient is incapable of monitoring the changes caused by a successful
attack, thus the attack is not detected; and 3) the presence of the honeyclient is detected by
the malicious pages, thus the attack is not run.
The first issue (the honeyclient must be vulnerable) can be addressed through careful
configuration of the honeyclient system. Old, vulnerable versions of browsers and operating
systems are used, and a large number of additional components (plugins and ActiveX)
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are installed on the system, to maximize the possibility of successful exploits1. Even if
this configuration is a complex task, in the rest of this chapter, we will assume that the
honeyclient system is vulnerable to at least one of the exploits launched by a malicious page.
Second, effective monitoring requires that the monitoring facilities used by the honeyclient
system cannot be bypassed by an attack. The well-known reference monitor concept [43]
describes a set of requirements that security mechanisms must enforce to prevent tampering
from the attacker and to ensure valid detection of the malicious activity:
Provide complete mediation: The monitoring mechanism must always be invoked, when
a potentially malicious URL is tested on the system. It is essential in the case of
honeyclients that the mechanism is able to detect all the possible changes that a successful
attack could produce on the targeted system.
Be tamperproof: The monitoring mechanism should not be susceptible to tampering. For
the honeyclient, this means that the malicious code should not be able to affect it in any
way. For example, if the malicious code were able to kill the monitoring process or to
blame another URL for the malicious activity, the reference monitor would be useless.
Be verifiable: The monitoring mechanism should be easy to verify for completeness and
correctness. Unfortunately, this might not be an easy task, given the complexity of today’s
1In [18] we showed that this approach has some inherent limitations, as there is a large number of vulnerable
plugins, some of which may be incompatible with each other. Therefore, it may be impractical to create an
environment that is vulnerable to all known attacks.
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honeyclients, which include large operating systems (e.g., Windows) and applications
(browsers).
A third venue of evasion is related to the transparency [33] of a high-interaction
honeyclient. The honeyclient system should be indistinguishable from a regular host, to
prevent malicious web pages from behaving differently inside a monitoring environment
than on a real host.
3.1.2 Design choices for high-interaction honeyclients
Given the requirements described above, there are a few important design choices that can
be made when developing a high-interaction honeyclient.
A first design choice is the placement of the monitoring mechanism inside or outside
the guest environment executing the browser process. This “in-VM” vs. “out-of-VM”
choice is a well-known and widely-discussed aspect of any malware analysis environment.
Developing the monitoring mechanisms within the guest operating system greatly simplifies
the architecture of the system, but, at the same time, makes the system vulnerable to detection,
as the artifacts that implement the monitoring infrastructure cohabitate with the malicious
code. By implementing the monitor at the kernel-level it is possible to better control access
to the monitoring artifacts (drivers, processes, etc.) However, this is at the cost of increased
complexity. In addition, there exist honeynet vulnerable configurations in which the code
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that attacks the browser is able to gain access to kernel-level data structures. In this case it
might be hard to hide the presence of the monitoring artifact from the malicious code.
We believe that a more appropriate model for honeyclients requires that the monitoring
system is completely isolated from the environment. By moving the inspection of the
potentially malicious code outside the virtual machine we guarantee that the attacker cannot
tamper with the system. In practice, this is not trivial to implement and there are several
obstacles to overcome, in order to have a deep insight of the program’s execution inside the
guest OS without compromising speed. We discuss in more detail the practical implications
of running the monitoring system inside a virtual machine in Section 3.4, and we propose
several methods on how to overcome the limitations of this approach.
Another design choice is the type and granularity of monitoring. This is a challenge
especially in Windows-based system, because the Windows OS has a very large number
of mechanisms for interacting with processes, injecting code, modifying files, etc. and
therefore it is not easy to create a monitoring infrastructure that is able to collect the right
type of events. This challenge is sometimes simplistically solved by collecting information
about the surrounding environment only after the execution of a web page has terminated.
By doing so, it is possible to determine if permanent damage has been caused to the guest
OS. However, as it will be described later, there are situations in which attacks might not
cause side-effects that are detectable.
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Figure 3.2: Capture-HPC Architecture
3.1.3 Honeyclients in practice
In this section, we provide a brief discussion of the general architecture and mode of
operation of high-interaction honeyclients. As an example, we use Capture-HPC [99], a very
popular, open-source honeyclient. To determine whether a URL is suspicious, Capture-HPC
visits this URL with a browser (typically, Internet Explorer) that runs in an instrumented
virtual machine.
In Figure 3.2, a more detailed overview of the architecture of Capture-HPC is shown. The
system design follows a client-server model. The server component manages a number
of clients and communicates with a VMware Server process to launch new, clean virtual
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machine instances. Each client component is running inside one of these virtual machines.
The client consists of a controller and three kernel modules to monitor file, registry, and
process events, respectively. The controller receives a list of URLs from the server and opens
a web browser to visit them. When a URL is visited, the kernel modules record all events that
are related to the browser (by matching events against the process ID of the browser). The
controller then checks the recorded events against a whitelist. This whitelist stores events
that are “normal” for the execution of the browser, such as writes to the browser’s cache.
When events occur that are not filtered by the whitelist, the controller reports these events,
together with the URL that triggered them, back to the server. Note that, for performance
reasons, Capture-HPC is also capable of spawning multiple browser instances inside the
same virtual machine, in order to process URLs in parallel.
In principle, all high-interaction honeyclients share an architecture that is very similar
to the one described here. These systems are all based on virtual machine technology
to revert to a clean state when a honeyclient instance gets compromised, and they use a
client-server model to provide a URL feed and to detect suspicious activity. For example,
HoneyClient [69] uses a stand-alone version of Capture-HPC’s client as its detection
component. Web Exploit Finder (WEF) [74] works in a way similar to Capture-HPC, but
instead of using kernel modules for monitoring, the system hooks directly into the System
Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) to intercept system calls. Finally, Shelia [92] takes a slightly
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different monitoring approach. Instead of hooking at the kernel level, it directly hooks
interesting Windows API function calls inside the browser process.
As it clear from this discussion, real-world, state-of-the-art honeyclients do not satisfy the
security requirements described at the beginning of this section. First of all, they all lack
transparency. All the available honeyclients operate within the guest VM, and, therefore,
they can easily be detected, by looking at specific artifacts. Second, they are not tamperproof,
as in a number of cases these tools can be disabled by the same malicious page that they
are analyzing. Third, real-world honeyclients do not provide complete mediation. There
are situations in which certain operations performed by the malicious web page can have a
negative impact on the security of the browser’s environment but are not monitored by the
system.
Attacks that explicitly exploit these weaknesses are the subject of the next section.
3.2 Attacks Against Honeyclients
In this section, we describe techniques that an attacker can mount against a honeyclient
system. The ultimate goal of the attacker is to avoid the detection of malicious activity
while her URL is visited. This can be done by in two ways: (i) the attack code can detect
the presence of the monitoring system and perform only benign activities, or (ii) the attack
code is run in such a way that it will avoid detection. That is, the attack does not generate
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any events that are considered malicious (e.g., no new processes are spawned and no
suspicious files or registry keys are accessed). We implemented several attacks and tested
their effectiveness against the four popular honeyclients described in the previous section:
Capture-HPC, HoneyClient, Shelia, and WEF. For this test, we selected a buffer overflow
exploit [20] that is served in a drive-by-download via Metasploit. The victim images (the
honeypots) were running Windows XP with Service Pack 2 and a vulnerable version of
Internet Explorer 7. We first verified that each of the four honeypots correctly detect the
attack. Then, we modified the drive-by exploit to implement each of the evasion attacks that
are described below, and we checked whether the technique was successful in preventing (or
evading) detection.
3.2.1 Fingerprinting the environment
A honeyclient system should not be differentiable from a true victim. If the attacker is able
to detect the presence of a monitoring system, then the malicious code will compromise true
victims but will perform only benign actions inside the honeypot.
Virtual machine detection. Due to the fact that many real-world drive-by attacks install
malware that tampers with the operating system, most honeyclients make use of virtual
machines. This way, a honeyclient can ensure that any change to the system will be reverted
back to a safe state through the use of virtual machine snapshots. Although virtual machines
make a honeyclient system immune to the attacks that it monitors, there is a drawback: the
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attacker has the opportunity to detect the presence of the virtual machine and, when a VM is
detected, conclude that the exploit code is running inside a monitored environment.
There are many known methods that can detect if code is running inside a VMware
virtual machine [29, 51, 84]. By using one of these techniques, the adversary can perform a
check that her code is not inside a virtualized environment. Since all the tested honeyclients
make use of VMware, we have chosen the ScoopyNG checks [51] as our method to detect
reliably the presence of virtual machines in practice. Although one can argue that there is an
increasing tendency to use virtual machines by moving parts of applications to the cloud, we
argue that regular end users do not browse the web through a VM. Rather, the normal case is
to run the browser in a non-virtualized environment.
Honeyclient detection. Another way to detect the presence of a monitoring system is to
check for artifacts of the honeyclient itself. For example, the attacker can detect the presence
of Capture-HPC and HoneyClient by looking in the file system for the CaptureClient.exe
binary, by checking whether specific kernel modules are loaded, or by looking for the active
processes that belong to these honey clients. Similarly, Shelia and WEF can be detected by
looking for their respective executable files, shelia.exe and BrowserControl.exe, or for their
required DLL files. In all cases, the systems do not take any measures to protect themselves
from this kind of detection.
Checking for the presence of particular files can even be done in the JavaScript code that
is responsible for launching an attack. This makes the check stealthier, because no actual
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1 var script = document.createElement("script")
2 script.type = "text/javascript";
3 script.src = "res://C:\\Program%20Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient.←↩
exe";
4 script.onreadystatechange= function () {
5 if(this.readyState == "complete")
6 alert("capture-hpc detected!"); };
7 document.getElementsByTagName("head")[0].appendChild(script);
Figure 3.3: Detecting Capture-HPC presence in the file system with JavaScript.
exploit is launched. In Figure 3.3, we show how an attacker can perform a simple check to
see if there are specific programs installed on the client’s machine. This novel attack method
tricks the JavaScript engine by asking it to load a source script from the client’s local file
system. We found out, much to our surprise, that JavaScript does not perform any checks to
see if the file requested is actually a JavaScript source file. Instead, it attempts to load the file,
and, if it is not of an expected format, a JavaScript runtime error is thrown. This allows us to
determine if any local file exists, simply by loading it. In this way, we are also able to detect
the presence of VMware Tools, which reveals the existence of a virtual machine. Notice that
this was tested only with Internet Explorer 7 and might not work with all of its versions.
Detection of hooked functions. Recently, there has been some effort in the research
community to detect hooks installed by malware [108]. Along similar lines, we try to
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detect the hooks set up by the monitoring environment. Certain honeyclients (and Shelia
in particular) use function call hooking to monitor and intercept calls to critical functions.
In this way, the honeyclient can prevent malicious behavior, in addition to detecting the
attack. For example, the honeyclient may avoid calling the real WinExec function to prevent
malware from executing on the system.
To hook functions, honeyclients can make use of the fact that the Windows compiler
reserves the first two bytes of library functions for hot-patching. More precisely, the compiler
places the instruction MOV EDI,EDI at the beginning of each library function prologue,
which acts as a two-byte long NOP operation. Monitoring systems such as Shelia can then
replace this instruction with a jump to a routine of their choice, which, once done, calls the
original function properly. In this way, calls to critical functions such as VirtualProtect,
WinExec, etc. can be intercepted and examined.
In Figure 3.4, we present the x86 assembly code that can be used to detect the presence
of hooks before calling a function. To do this, we verify, before calling a critical function,
that the first operation at the memory address where the function is located (EBX in our
example) contains a MOV instruction and not JMP or CALL. As a result, the exploit code
can refuse to run when function hooking is identified, or the attack code could jump over the
hook to the first “real” instruction. This technique allows us to successfully detect and evade
Shelia. However, this technique does not work against the other tested honeyclients, since
they collect information inside the kernel.
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1 checkhooks:
2 CMP BYTE [DS:EBX], 0xE9 ; 0xE9 == jmp
3 JE hooked
4 CMP BYTE [DS:EBX], 0xE8 ; 0xE8 == call
5 JE hooked
6 CMP BYTE [DS:EBX], 0x8B ; 0x8B == mov
7 JE safe_vprotect
8 safe_vprotect:
9 PUSH ESP ; PDWORD lpflOldProtect
10 PUSH 0x40 ; DWORD flNewProtect,
11 ; PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
12 PUSH 0x7d0 ; SIZE_T dwSize , 2000
13 PUSH EAX ; LPVOID lpAddress
14 CALL EBX ; call VirtualProtect
15 hooked:
16 ;function is hooked
17 RET
Figure 3.4: Function hooks detection: before calling a critical function, we check if it is
hooked.
HTTP referrer check. As part of a drive-by download attack, the victim issues an HTTP
GET request to the attacker’s web server to actually download the exploit code. Of course,
the attacker is able to check the referrer of this request. If the attacker has any control
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over (or knowledge about) the site(s) where her malicious URLs are being advertised,
then this information can be used to serve malicious content only when the Referer header
matches one of these expected sites. For example, the exploit might be served only if the
referrer is google.com. Other Referer header values indicate that the requests are from
analysis systems such as honeypots (although these systems might be able to set the Referer
field to an expected value and thwart this check). This attack is effective against all tested
honeyclients, since it occurs before the victim’s infection and thus is independent of the
detection approach.
3.2.2 Evading detection
Although the attacker may be unaware that her malware is running in a monitored system,
she can perform some tasks that are not easily detectable by honeyclients. These tasks
constitute a barrier that can be used to hide or delay the intended, malicious behavior until
the adversary is sure that the attacked system is an actual victim computer.
Delayed exploitation. In a drive-by download, the attacker can decide to wait for some
time before performing the exploit, or to trigger the execution of an exploit based on the
occurrence of a user-triggered event. For example, the malicious JavaScript code can sleep
for some seconds. The idea is that this delay will trigger a time-out on the honeyclient system
(after which the analysis of the current page is terminated), but it will enable attacks against
a real user who keeps the malicious page open long enough (until the time-out expires). The
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honeyclients that we examined use a timeout of no more than 30 seconds, and hence, can be
evaded when running the exploit is delayed by at least this amount of time.
Unfortunately, setting long timeouts makes the attack unreliable, since real users might
leave the malicious site before the attack is invoked. Another way to implement a timebomb
consists of waiting for some user interaction before launching the attack. This technique can
be implemented by using JavaScript event handlers, such as onMouseOver. In this case,
the idea is that a real user will likely move the mouse over the page, and, by doing so, will
generate the mouseOver event. This will execute the corresponding handler, which, in
turn, launches the attack. A honeyclient, on the other hand, will not trigger such events, and,
thus, the attack remains undetected.
In-memory execution. Current honeyclient systems focus on monitoring events that are
related to file system, registry, and process activity. Thus, an attack remains undetected
as long as the malicious code does not interfere with these operating system resources.
However, as the adversary, we would still like to execute additional malware code.
To load and execute malicious code in a stealth fashion, we can make use of remote library
injection, in particular, a technique called Reflective DLL injection [30]. In this case, a
(remote) library is loaded from the shellcode directly into the memory of the running process,
without being registered in the process’ list of loaded modules, which is stored in the Process
Environment Block (PEB). Once the library is loaded, the shellcode calls an initialization
function, which, in our case, injects a thread to the browser’s process. At this point, the
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execution is returned back to the browser, which continues to run normally. However, there
is now an additional thread running that executes the malicious code.
When injecting the malicious code directly into the process, there are no additional
processes spawned, files created, or registry entries manipulated. Thus, the attack evades the
tested honeyclients. Of course, the malware code itself cannot write to the file system either
(or it would be detect). However, it is possible to open network connections and participate
in a botnet that, for example, sends spam, steals browser credentials, or conducts denial of
service attacks. A drawback is that the malicious code does not survive reboots (or even
closing the browser).
Whitelist manipulation. When visiting any URL, the browser interacts with the operat-
ing system and generates a certain number of events. Of course, these events do not indicate
malicious behavior, and thus, they need to be removed before analyzing the effects that
visiting a page has on the system. To this end, honeyclients use whitelists. However, this also
means that the attacker has limited freedom in performing certain, whitelisted (operating
system) actions, such as browser cache file writes, registry keys accesses etc., that will not
be detected as malicious. The interesting question is whether these actions can be leveraged
to compromise the host’s security.
The attacks described in this section are not relevant for Shelia, which uses function hooks
to identify malicious activity, but apply to the remaining three honeyclients that record and
monitor system calls.
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1 void CrawlDirs(wchar startupdir[]) {
2 WIN32_FIND_DATA ffd;
3 HANDLE hFind;
4 hFind = FindFirstFile(startupdir, &ffd);
5 do {
6 if (ffd.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)
7 CrawlDirectories(startupdir+"\\"+ffd.cFileName);
8 else {
9 if(is_js_file(ffd.cFileName))
10 patch_js(ffd, path);
11 }
12 } while (FindNextFile(hFind, &ffd) != 0);
13 }
Figure 3.5: Browser cache poisoning attack.
To show the weakness of whitelisting, we have implemented a browser cache poisoning
attack. This attack leverages that fact that write to files in the Internet Explorer cache are
typically permitted. The reason is that reads and writes to these files occur as part of the
normal browser operation, and hence, have to be permitted (note that Honeyclients could
also disable the browser cache, making this attack ineffective).
We have implemented an attack that poisons any JavaScript file found in Internet Explorer’s
cache. With “poisoning,” we mean that we add to every JavaScript file in the browser’s
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cache a small code snippet that redirects the browser to a malicious site. Thus, whenever the
browser opens a page that it has visited before, and this page contains a link to a cached script,
the browser will load and use the local, modified version of the script. As a result, the browser
will get redirected and re-infected. The purpose of this attack is that it allows the adversary
to make a compromise persistent without triggering the detection of a high-interaction
honeyclient. That is, an adversary could launch an in-memory attack (as described in the
previous section) and poison the cached JavaScript files with a redirect to her exploit site.
Even when the victim closes the browser or reboots, it is enough to visit any page that
loads a modified, cached script, to re-infect the machine in a way that is not detected by a
honeyclient.
In Figure 3.5, we present a simplified version of our implementation of the cache poisoning
attack. The algorithm starts from a predefined directory location (in our implementation,
the directory Temporary Internet Files) and recursively searches for JavaScript source files.
When a JavaScript source file is found, then the file is patched by inserting a redirection to
the malicious site, using JavaScript’s window.location property.
As a proof of concept for an attack that uses both in-memory execution and whitelist
manipulation, we developed a keylogger that can survive boots. The keylogger runs entirely
in memory, and, instead of writing the pressed keys into a file, it uses GET requests to send
collected data directly to a web server.
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1 void keylogger() {
2 wchar_t buffer[SIZE];
3 while(1) {
4 /* Appends keystrokes to buffer using GetAsyncKeyState */
5 buffer = get_keys();
6 /* Contacts attacker's webserver with buffer appended to ←↩
path requested using WinHttpSendRequest*/
7 httpget(buffer);
8 }
9 }
Figure 3.6: In-memory keylogger: collects keystrokes and sends them to the attacker with
HTTP GET requests.
The outline of our implementation is presented in Figure 3.6. The code shows the body
of the thread that is injected into Internet Explorer’s process with the use of the Reflective
DLL injection technique. The implementation is straightforward: we gather keystrokes by
invoking the GetAsyncKeyState function offered by the Windows API. When our buffer
is full, we send the keystrokes to our webserver by appending the buffer to the path field.
Our keylogger is part of Internet Explorer’s process, and thus, is very hard to detect, as it is
normal for this process to perform HTTP GET requests.
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To survive reboots, the keylogger also poisons all JavaScript source files in the browser
cache. As a consequence, after reboot, the next time the victim visits a URL with cached
JavaScript code, she will be re-infected. The honeyclients raise no alert, since all activity
appears legitimate to their detection routines.
Honeyclient confusion. For performance reasons, honeyclients are capable of visiting
multiple URLs at the same time. This speeds up the analysis process significantly, since
the checking of URLs can be done in parallel by multiple browser instances. By using the
process IDs of the different browsers, their events can be distinguished from each another.
The adversary can take advantage of this feature and try to confuse the honeyclient.
In particular, the malicious code might carry out activities that are properly detected by
the honeyclient as malicious, but they are blamed on a (benign) URL that is concurrently
examined.
This is done by searching for concurrent, active Internet Explorer processes, as shown in
Figure 3.7. Through the IWebBrowser2 interface, we can control each browser instance, in
the same way as, for example, Capture-HPC does. At this point, we can force any browser
instance to visit a URL of our choice. For example, we can force the browser to visit a
malicious URL under our control. This malicious URL can serve a drive-by download
exploit that, when successful, downloads and executes malware. Of course, the honeyclient
does not know that the browser has been forced to a different URL (by code in another
browser instance), since this could also have been the effect of a benign redirect. Thus, even
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when the malware performs actions that are detected, they will be blamed on the original,
benign URL that Capture-HPC has initially loaded into the misdirected browser.
The purpose of this attack is to invalidate the correctness of the results produced by a
honeyclient and thus, we propose to use it only when we have previously identified the
presence of a monitoring system. Also, the attack does not work when a honeyclient uses
only a single browser instance. However, constraining a honeyclient to test one URL at the
time forces the honeyclient system to accept a major performance penalty.
3.2.3 Summary
We have implemented all the previously-described attacks and tested them against four
popular, open-source honeyclients. Table 3.1 summarizes our results and shows that each
honeyclient is vulnerable to most of the proposed attacks. Moreover, different attack vectors
are independent and, hence, can be easily combined.
3.3 Attacks in the Real World
To better understand the extent to which high-interaction honeyclients are attacked in the
real-world, we have deployed an installation of Capture-HPC. Then, we have fed this popular,
high-interaction honeyclient with 33,557 URLs that were collected from various sources,
such as spam URLs, web crawls, and submissions to Wepawet [18].
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Attack successful?
Attack Capture-HPC Shelia WEF HoneyClient
Plain drive-by 7 7 7 7
VM detection 3 3 3 3
JavaScript FS checks 3 3 3 3
Hooks detection 7 3 7 7
HTTP referrer 3 3 3 3
JS timebomb 3 3 3 3
In-memory execution 3 3 3 3
Whitelist manipulation 3 7 3 3
Confusion attack 3 7 3 3
Table 3.1: Summary of the attacks: a 7 indicates that the attack did not evade the
honeyclient, a3 indicates that the attack was not detected.
Detection system Total URLs Malicious Benign
Capture-HPC 33,557 644 32,913
Wepawet 33,557 9,230 24,327
Table 3.2: Capture-HPC and Wepawet analysis results.
Then, we compared the detection results of Wepawet and Capture-HPC for the collected
URLs. Wepawet is a tool, developed by our group, that uses anomaly-based detection to
identify malicious web pages by looking directly for malicious JavaScript, without checking
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Malicious/Suspicious URLs undetected by Capture-HPC
JS Method Occurrences
setTimeOut 347
onMouseOver 419
onmouseout 403
onClick 137
Referrer 1,894
Table 3.3: Possible JavaScript evasion techniques against Capture-HPC found in the wild.
for the byproducts of a successful attack. Notice that a page marked by Wepawet as malicious
contains some type of an attack that could compromise a system, but not every system will
get compromised by executing the code. We have found that Wepawet has very low false
positive and negative rates, and hence, its output serves as ground truth for the purpose of
this evaluation [18]. Looking at Table 3.2, we can see that Wepawet found significantly
more malicious sites in the wild. Of particular interest are 8,835 cases in which Wepawet
detected malicious or suspicious activity, while Capture-HPC marked the URLs as benign,
because there is a significant chance that these attacks try to avoid detection by systems such
as Capture-HPC.
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As a first step, we searched the pages that correspond to the malicious URLs for VM
detection methods that are commonly employed by shellcode. Since the shellcode is
typically encoded and, in addition, often obfuscated, we performed this search on the
decoded JavaScript output provided by Wepawet. Moreover, we attempted to “break” the
possible obfuscation of shellcode by xor’ing all shellcode strings with all possible (256)
one-byte values and checking for a regular expression that indicates a (malware download)
URL. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, we could not identify any shellcode that used
known VM detection code.
In the next step, we checked for common JavaScript evasion techniques (as described in
Section 3.2). In this case, our search turned out to be more fruitful, and we found a number
of instances in which JavaScript code makes use of timeouts and event handlers (as shown in
Table 3.3). Notice that the dominating technique is the HTTP Referer check.
We also found an interesting case in which, after the victim got infected, the malware
rebooted the virtual machine. Although the attacker probably did not have the intention to
avoid detection from Capture-HPC, she actually did. In fact, since the machine is rebooting,
all running processes are killed. This means that Capture-HPC’s client is also killed. This
happens immediately after infection. Because Capture-HPC’s client waits for all browser
instances to finish loading their URLs, this event precedes reporting back to Capture-HPC’s
server. As a result, the server loses the connection with the client. When this happens, the
server simply believes that the client has crashed, so it restores the virtual machine to a safe
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snapshot and restarts the client. This means that all the information gathered by the previous
instance of the client is lost. Thus, although the virtual machine is rebooting, an obvious
malicious act, Capture-HPC is unable to detect the malicious URL that caused it.
Another (possibly involuntary) evasion technique that we observed has to do with the
fact that Capture-HPC is built as a Windows Console Application. After the infection, we
noticed that a new command (DOS) window was spawned by the exploit code. After a few
seconds, this command prompt was killed. But, by doing so, the Capture-HPC process was
killed as well. The reason is that Capture-HPC is also invoked from the Windows command
prompt (cmd.exe). Thus, when the exploit code kills all command prompts as part of its
operations, the Capture-HPC process is killed as well. From this point on, the detection fails
for the same reasons described in the previous paragraph.
3.4 Countermeasures
In this chapter, we have shown a number of attacks that an adversary can use to prevent the
detection of her malicious web pages by a honeyclient system. In this section, we focus
on the countermeasures that existing honeyclient systems may implement to detect attacks
more robustly.
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3.4.1 Transparency
We have seen that it is often easy for a malicious page to detect that it is running in a
high-interaction honeyclient (as opposed to a regular host). This issue should be addressed
at several levels.
File system level. The attacker should not be able to discover the files related to the
monitoring infrastructure on the honeyclient’s file system. For example, in the default setup
of Capture-HPC, a simple search into the Program Files directory reveals the use of VMware
Tools and Capture-HPC. These files should be hidden in the file system so that the attacker
must put significant effort in finding them, and the honeyclient should be able to detect the
attacker’s attempt to locate these files.
Kernel level. The attacker should not be able to detect the presence of kernel drivers that
honeyclients use for monitoring system level changes. We are not aware of any method
offered by the Windows API that can be used to hide the presence of a driver from a process.
Therefore, honeyclients could rely on rootkit techniques, such as Direct Kernel Object
Manipulation (DKOM) [101], to hide the presence of these modules. Notice that, by
using the same techniques, a honeyclient could hide processes and files that it uses for its
monitoring.
Network level. If the monitored system is deployed on a static location on the Internet,
its IP address or subnet may be identified by attackers [53]. It is, therefore, necessary to
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deploy the monitored system in several locations, using multiple ISPs in order eliminate the
possibility of getting blacklisted by the attacker at the network level.
Hypervisor level. Implementing the monitoring system at the hypervisor level offers
complete isolation between the analysis environment and the malware. Although this
approach seems ideal, inspecting the operating system from “outside the box” is not trivial,
and it requires a significant effort to reverse engineer the necessary operating system data
structures to bridge the semantic gap.
Thwarting virtual machine detection. The virtual machines currently used for mali-
cious behavior analysis are not designed to be transparent [33]. As we have seen in Chapter 2,
there has been significant effort to create stealthier virtual machines, such as MAVMM [76],
and transparent monitoring systems, such as Ether [23]. These techniques could be used in
future honeyclient systems.
3.4.2 Protection of the monitoring system
Protecting the browser. A successful exploit against a browser vulnerability typically
gives the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the exploited browser
process. The attacker can then subvert other browser processes, compromising the integrity
of the detection, as we have seen in the case of the confusion attack. High-interaction
honeyclients that run multiple browser instances should take steps to isolate each instance
from the others, for example by executing them under different principals. Alternatively,
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the honeyclient process could monitor browser processes to detect attempts to manipulate
their execution. For example, the honeyclient system could monitor the Handles that belong
to each browser’s process, using the GetProcessHandleCount function provided by the
Windows API. In this fashion, one can monitor for cases when the attacker attempts to
manipulate a browser and protect the results produced by revisiting one by one the URLs
associated with the manipulated browser’s instances.
Protecting the honeyclient processes. Any honeyclient process that runs inside the
virtual machine needs to be protected from tampering (e.g., from getting terminated) by
the attacker. One way to achieve this is by running the honeyclient processes with elevated
privileges compared to the browser’s processes. It is also possible to check for and intercept
attempts to terminate the honeyclient processes.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the security model that high-interaction honeyclients use,
and we evaluated their weaknesses in practice. We introduced and discussed a number of
possible attacks, and we test them against several popular, well-known high-interaction
honeyclients. In particular, we have introduced three novel attack techniques (JavaScript-
based honeyclient detection, in-memory execution, and whitelist-based attacks) and put
under the microscope already-known attacks. Our attacks evade the detection of the
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tested honeyclients, while successfully compromising regular visitors. Furthermore, we
suggest several countermeasures aiming to improve honeyclients. By employing these
countermeasures, a honeyclient will be better protected from evasion attempts and will
provide more accurate results.
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1 SHDocVw::IShellWindowsPtr spSHWinds;
2 IDispatchPtr spDisp;
3 IWebBrowser2 * pWebBrowser = NULL;
4 HRESULT hr;
5
6 // get all active browsers
7 spSHWinds.CreateInstance(__uuidof(SHDocVw::ShellWindows));
8
9 // get one, or iterate va to get each one
10 spDisp = spSHWinds->Item (va);
11
12 // get IWebBrowser2 pointer
13 hr = spDisp.QueryInterface (IID_IWebBrowser2, & pWebBrowser);
14
15 if (SUCCEEDED(hr) && pWebBrowser != NULL) {
16 visitUrl(pWebBrowser); // with the use of IWebBrowser2::←↩
Navigate2
17 }
Figure 3.7: Confuse honeyclient: find an Internet Explorer instance and force it to visit a
URL of our choice.
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Chapter 4
An Automated Approach to the
Detection of Evasive Web-based
Malware
In the previous chapter we showed how evasions work against high-interaction honey-
clients. In this chapter, we focus on JavaScript-based evasions that target low-interaction
honeyclients by introducing Revolver, a novel approach to automatically detect evasive
behavior in malicious JavaScript. Revolver uses efficient techniques to identify similarities
between a large number of JavaScript programs (despite their use of obfuscation techniques,
such as packing, polymorphism, and dynamic code generation), and to automatically
interpret their differences to detect evasions.
In the last several years, we have seen web-based malware—malware distributed over the
web, exploiting vulnerabilities in web browsers and their plugins—becoming a prevalent
threat. Microsoft reports that it detected web-based exploits against over 3.5 million
distinct computers in the first quarter of 2012 alone [68]. In particular, drive-by-download
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attacks are the method of choice for attackers to compromise and take control of victim
machines [39, 82]. At the core of these attacks are pieces of malicious HTML and JavaScript
code that launch browser exploits.
Recently, a number of techniques have been proposed to detect the code used in drive-by-
download attacks. A common approach is the use of honeyclients (specially instrumented
browsers) that visit a suspect page and extract a number of features that help in determining
if a page is benign or malicious. Such features can be based on static characteristics of the
examined code [14, 19], on specifics of its dynamic behavior [18, 61, 75, 81, 88, 106], or on a
combination of static and dynamic features [91].
Drive-by downloads initially contained only the code that exploits the browser. This
approach was defeated by static detection of the malicious code using signatures. The
attackers started to obfuscate the code in order to make the attacks impossible to be matched
by signatures. Obfuscated code needs to be executed by a JavaScript engine to truly reveal
the final code that performs the attack. This is why researchers moved to dynamic analysis
systems which execute the JavaScript code, deobfuscating this way the attacks regardless
of the targeted vulnerable browser or plugin. As a result, the attackers have introduced
evasions: JavaScript code that detects the presence of the monitoring system and behaves
differently at runtime. Any diversion from the original targeted vulnerable browser (e.g.,
missing functionality, additional objects, etc.) can be used as an evasion.
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As a result, malicious code is not a static artifact that, after being created, is reused
without changes. To the contrary, attackers have strong motivations to modify the code they
use so that it is more likely to evade the defense mechanisms employed by end-users and
security researchers, while continuing to be successful at exploiting vulnerable browsers. For
example, attackers may obfuscate their code so that it does not match the string signatures
used by antivirus tools (a situation similar to the polymorphic techniques used in binary
malware). Attackers may also mutate their code with the intent of evading a specific detection
tool, such as one of the honeyclients mentioned above.
In this chapter we propose Revolver, a novel approach to automatically identify evasions
in drive-by-download attacks. In particular, given a piece of JavaScript code, Revolver
efficiently identifies scripts that are similar to that code, and automatically classifies the
differences between two scripts that have been determined to be similar. Revolver first
identifies syntactic-level differences in similar scripts (e.g., insertion, removal, or substitution
of snippets of code). Then Revolver attempts to explain the semantics of such differences
(i.e., their effect on page execution). We show that these changes often correspond to the
introduction of evasive behavior (i.e., functionality designed to evade popular honeyclient
tools).
There are several challenges that Revolver needs to address to make this approach feasible
in practice. First, typical drive-by-download web pages serve malicious code that is heavily
obfuscated. The code may be mutated from one visit to the page to the next by using
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simple polymorphic techniques, e.g., by randomly renaming variables and functions names.
Polymorphism creates a multitude of differences in two pieces of code. From a superficial
analysis, two functionally identical pieces of code will appear as very different. In addition,
malicious code may be produced on-the-fly, by dynamically generating and executing
new code (through JavaScript and browser DOM constructs such as the eval() and
setTimeout() functions). Dynamic code generation poses a problem of coverage; that
is, not all JavaScript code may be readily available to the analyzer. Therefore, a naive
approach that attempts to directly compare two malicious scripts would be easily thwarted
by these obfuscation techniques and would fail to detect their similarities. Instead, Revolver
dynamically monitors the execution of JavaScript code in a web page so that it can analyze
both the scripts that are statically present in the page and those that are generated at runtime.
In addition, to overcome polymorphic mutations of code, Revolver performs its similarity
matching by analyzing the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of code, thereby ignoring superficial
changes to its source code.
Another challenge that Revolver must address is scalability. For a typical analysis of a
web page, Revolver needs to compare several JavaScript scripts (more precisely, their ASTs)
with a repository of millions of ASTs (potential matches) to identify similar ones. To make
this similarity matching computationally efficient, we use a number of machine learning
techniques, such as dimensionality reduction and clustering algorithms.
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Finally, not all code changes are security-relevant. For example, a change in a portion of
the code that is never executed is less interesting than one that causes a difference in the
runtime behavior of the script. In particular, we are interested in identifying code changes
that cause detection tools to misclassify a malicious script as benign. To identify such
evasive code changes, Revolver focuses on modifications that introduce control flow changes
in the program. These changes may indicate that the modified program checks whether
it is being analyzed by a detector tool (rather than an unsuspecting visitor) and exhibits a
different behavior depending on the result of this check.
By automatically identifying code changes designed to evade drive-by-download detectors,
one can improve detection tools and increase their detection rate. We also leverage Revolver
to identify benign scripts (e.g., well-known libraries) that have been injected with malicious
code, and, thus, display malicious behavior.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• Code similarity detection: We introduce techniques to efficiently identify JavaScript
code snippets that are similar to each other. Our tool is resilient to obfuscation techniques,
such as polymorphism and dynamic code generation, and also pinpoints the precise
differences (changes in their ASTs) between two different versions of similar scripts.
• Detection of evasive code: We present several techniques to automatically classify
differences between two similar scripts to highlight their purpose and effect on the
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executed code. In particular, Revolver has identified several techniques that attackers use
to evade existing detection tools by continuously running in parallel with a honeyclient.
4.1 Background and Overview
To give the reader a better understanding of the motivation for our system and the problems
that it addresses, we start with a discussion of malicious JavaScript code used in drive-by-
download attacks. Moreover, we present an example of the kind of code similarities that we
found in the wild.
Malicious JavaScript code. The web pages involved in drive-by-download attacks typi-
cally include malicious JavaScript code. This code is usually obfuscated, and it fingerprints
the visitor’s browser, identifies vulnerabilities in the browser itself or the plugins that the
browser uses, and finally launches one or more exploits. These attacks target memory cor-
ruption vulnerabilities or insecure APIs that, if successfully exploited, enable the attackers
to execute arbitrary code of their choice.
Figure 4.1 shows a portion of the code used in a recent drive-by-download attack against
users of the Internet Explorer browser. The code (slightly edited for the sake of clarity)
instantiates a shellcode (Line 8) by concatenating the variables defined at Lines 1–7; a later
portion of the code (not shown in the figure) triggers a memory corruption vulnerability,
which, if successful, causes the shellcode to be executed.
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A common approach to detect such attacks is to use honeyclients, which are tools that pose
as regular browsers, but are able to analyze the code included in the page and the side-effects
of its execution. More precisely, low-interaction honeyclients emulate regular browsers and
use various heuristics to identify malicious behavior during the visit of a web page [18,41,75].
High-interaction honeyclients consist of full-featured web browsers running in a monitoring
environment that tracks all modifications to the underlying system, such as files created and
processes launched [81, 99, 106]. If any unexpected modification occurs, it is considered to
be a manifestation of a successful exploit. Notice that this sample is difficult to detect with a
signature, as strings are randomized on each visit to the compromised site.
Evasive code. Attackers have a vested interest in crafting their code to evade the detection
of analysis tools, while remaining effective at exploiting regular users. This allows their
pages to stay “under the radar” (and actively malicious) for a longer period of time, by
avoiding being included in blacklists such as Google’s Safe Browsing [37] or being targeted
by take-down requests.
Attackers can use a number of techniques to avoid detection [86]: for example, code
obfuscation is effective against tools that rely on signatures, such as antivirus scanners;
requiring arbitrary user interaction can undermine high-interaction honeyclients; probing
for arcane characteristics of browser features (likely not correctly emulated in browser
emulators) can thwart low-interaction honeyclients.
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1 var nop="%uyt9yt2yt9yt2";
2 var nop=(nop.replace(/yt/g,""));
3 var sc0="%ud5db%uc9c9%u87cd...";
4 var sc1="%"+"yutianu"+"ByutianD"+ ...;
5 var sc1=(sc1.replace(/yutian/g,""));
6 var sc2="%"+"u"+"54"+"FF"+...+"8"+"E"+"E";
7 var sc2=(sc2.replace(/yutian/g,""));
8 var sc=unescape(nop+sc0+sc1+sc2);
Figure 4.1: Malicious code that sets up a shellcode.
An effective way to implement this kind of circumventing techniques consists of adding
some specialized “evasive code” whose only purpose is to cause detector tools to fail on an
existing malicious script. Of course, the evasive code is designed in such a way that regular
browsers (used by victims) effectively ignore it. Such evasive code could, for example, pack
an exploit code in an obfuscation routine, check for human interaction, or implement a test
for detecting browser emulators (such evasive code is conceptually similar to “red pills”
employed in binary malware to detect and evade commonly-used analysis tools [29]).
Figure 4.2 shows an evasive modification to the original exploit of Figure 4.1, which we
also found used in the wild. More precisely, the code tries to load a non-existent ActiveX
control, named yutian (Line 2). On a regular browser, this operation fails, triggering the
execution of the catch branch (Lines 4–11), which contains an identical copy of the malicious
code of Figure 4.1. However, low-interaction honeyclients usually emulate the ActiveX
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1 try {
2 new ActiveXObject("yutian");
3 } catch (e) {
4 var nop="%uyt9yt2yt9yt2";
5 var nop=(nop.replace(/yt/g,""));
6 var sc0="%ud5db%uc9c9%u87cd...";
7 var sc1="%"+"yutianu"+"ByutianD"+ ...;
8 var sc1=(sc1.replace(/yutian/g,""));
9 var sc2="%"+"u"+"54"+"FF"+...+"8"+"E"+"E";
10 var sc2=(sc2.replace(/yutian/g,""));
11 var sc=unescape(nop+sc0+sc1+sc2);
12 }
Figure 4.2: An evasion using non-existent ActiveX controls.
API by simulating the presence of any ActiveX control. In these systems, the loading of
the ActiveX control does not raise any exception; as a consequence, the shellcode is not
instantiated correctly, which stops the execution of the exploits and causes the honeyclient to
fail to detect the malicious activity.
Detecting evasive code using code similarity. Code similarity approaches have been
proposed in the past, but none of them has focused specifically on malicious JavaScript.
There are several challenges involved when processing malicious JavaScript for similarities.
Attackers actively try to trigger parsing issues in analyzers. The code is usually heavily
obfuscated, which means that statically examining the code is not enough. The malicious
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code itself is designed to evade signature detection from antivirus products. This renders
string-based and token-based code similarity approaches ineffective against malicious
JavaScript. We will show later how regular code similarity tools, such as Moss [96], fail
when analyzing obfuscated scripts. In Revolver, we extend tree-based code similarity
approaches and focus on making our system robust against malicious JavaScript. We
elaborate on our novel code similarity techniques in §4.2.4.
At a high-level overview, we use Revolver to detect and understand the similarity between
two code scripts. Intuitively, Revolver is provided with the code of both scripts and their
classification by one or more honeyclient tools. In our running example, we assume that the
code in Figure 4.1 is flagged as malicious and the one in Figure 4.2 as benign. Revolver
starts by extracting the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) corresponding to each script. Revolver
inspects the ASTs rather than the original code samples to abstract away possible superficial
differences in the scripts (e.g., the renaming of variables). When analyzing the AST of
Figure 4.2, it detects that it is similar to the AST of the code in Figure 4.1. The change is
deemed to be interesting, since it introduces a difference (the try-catch statement) that may
cause a change in the control flow of the original program. Our system also determines that
the added code (the statement that tries to load the ActiveX control) is indeed executed by
tools visiting the page, thus increasing the relevance of the detected change (execution bits
are described in more detail in §4.2.1). Finally, Revolver classifies the modification as a
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possible evasion attempt, since it causes the honeyclient to change its detection result (from
malicious to benign).
Assumptions and limitations. Our approach is based on a few assumptions. Revolver
relies on external detection tools to collect (and make available) a repository of JavaScript
code, and to provide a classification of such code as either malicious or benign (i.e., Revolver
is not a detection tool by itself). To obtain code samples and classification scores, we can
rely on several publicly-available detectors [18, 41, 75].
Attackers might write a brand new attack with all components (evasion, obfuscation,
exploit code) written from scratch. In such cases, Revolver will not be able to find any
similarities the first time it analyzes these attacks. The lack of similarities though can be
used to our advantage, since we can isolate brand-new attacks (provided that they can be
identified by other means) based on the fact that we have never observed such code before.
In the same spirit, to detect evasions, Revolver needs to inspect two versions of a malicious
script: the “regular” version, which does not contain evasive code, and the “evasive” version,
which attempts to circumvent detection tools. Furthermore, if an evasion is occurring, we
assume that a detection tool would classify these two versions differently. In particular, if
only the evasive version of a JavaScript program is available, Revolver will not be able to
detect this evasion. We consider this condition to be unlikely. In fact, trend results from
a recent Google study on circumvention [86] suggest that malicious code evolves over
time to incorporate more sophisticated techniques (including evasion). Thus, having a
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sufficiently large code repository should allow us to have access to both regular and evasive
versions of a script. Furthermore, we have anecdotal evidence of malware authors creating
different versions of their malicious scripts and submitting them to public analyzers, until
they determine that their programs are no longer detected (this situation is reminiscent of the
use of anti-antivirus services in the binary malware world [54]).
Revolver is not effective when server-side evasion (for example, IP cloaking) is used: in
such cases, the malicious web site does not serve at all the malicious content to a detector
coming from a blocked IP address, and, therefore, no analysis of its content is possible. This
is a general limitation of all analysis tools and can be solved by means of a better analysis
infrastructure (for example, by visiting malicious sites from IP addresses and networks that
are not known to be associated with analysts and security researchers and cannot be easily
fingerprinted by attackers).
4.2 Approach
In this section, we describe Revolver in detail, focusing on the techniques that it uses to find
similarities between JavaScript files.
A high-level overview of Revolver is presented in Figure 4.3. First, we leverage an
existing drive-by-download detection tool (an “Oracle”) to collect datasets of both benign
and malicious web pages (§4.2.1). Second, Revolver extracts the ASTs (§4.2.2) of the
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of Revolver.
JavaScript code contained in these pages and, leveraging the Oracle’s classification for
the code that contains them, marks them as either benign or malicious. Third, Revolver
computes a similarity score for each pair of ASTs, where one AST is malicious and the other
one can be either benign or malicious (§4.2.3–§4.2.4). Finally, pairs that are found to have a
similarity score higher than a given threshold are further analyzed to identify and classify
their similarities (§4.2.5).
If Revolver finds similarities between two malicious scripts, then we classify this case
as an instance of evolution (typically, an improvement of the original malicious code). On
the other hand, if Revolver detects similarities between a malicious and a benign script, it
performs an additional classification step. In particular, similarities can be classified by
Revolver into one of four possible categories: evasions, injections, data dependencies, and
general evolutions. We are especially interested in identifying evasions, which indicate
changes that cause a script that had been found to be malicious before to be flagged as benign
now.
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It is important to note that, due to JavaScript’s ability to produce additional JavaScript
code on the fly (which enables extremely complex JavaScript packers and obfuscators),
performing this analysis statically would not be possible. Revolver works dynamically, by
analyzing all JavaScript code that is compiled in the course of a web page’s execution. By
including all these scripts, and the relationships between them (such as what code created
what other code), Revolver is able to calculate JavaScript similarities among malicious web
pages to an extent that is not, to our knowledge, possible with existing state-of-the-art code
comparison tools.
4.2.1 Oracle
Revolver relies on existing drive-by-download detection tools for a single task: the classifica-
tion of scripts in web pages as either malicious or benign. Notice that our approach is not tied
to a specific detection technique or tool; therefore, we use the term “Oracle” to generically
refer to any such detection system. In particular, several popular low- and high-interaction
honeyclients (e.g., [18, 41, 75, 99]) or any antivirus scanner can readily be used for Revolver.
Revolver analyzes the Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) of individual scripts rather than
examining web pages as a whole. Therefore, Revolver performs a refinement step, in which
i) individual ASTs are extracted from the web pages obtained from the Oracle, ii) their
detection status is determined (that is, each AST is classified as either benign or malicious),
based on the page classification provided by the Oracle, and iii) for each node in an AST,
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it is recorded whether the corresponding statement was executed. Of course, if an Oracle
natively provides this fine-grained information, this step can be skipped.
More precisely, Revolver executes each web page using a browser emulator based on
HtmlUnit [34]. The emulator parses the page and extracts all of its JavaScript content (e.g.,
the content of script tags and the body of event handlers). In particular, the ASTs of the
JavaScript code are saved for later analysis. In addition, to obtain the AST of dynamically-
generated code, Revolver executes the JavaScript code. At the end of the execution, for each
node in the AST, Revolver keeps an execution bit to record whether the code corresponding
to that node was executed. Whenever it encounters a function that generates new code (e.g.,
a call to the eval() or setTimeout() functions), Revolver analyzes the code that is
generated by these functions. It also saves the parent-child relationship between scripts, i.e.,
which script is responsible for the execution of a dynamically-generated script. For example,
the script containing the eval() call is considered the parent of the script that is evaluated.
Similarly, Revolver keeps track of which script causes network resources to be fetched, for
example, by creating an iframe tag.
Second, for each AST, Revolver determines if it is malicious or benign, based on the
Oracle’s input. More precisely, an AST is considered malicious if it is the parent of a
malicious AST, or if it issued a web request that led to the execution of malicious code. This
makes Revolver flexible enough to work with any Oracle.
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4.2.2 Abstract Syntax Trees
Revolver’s core analysis is based on the examination of ASTs rather than the source code of
a script. The rationale for using ASTs is that they abstract away details that are irrelevant for
our analysis (and, in fact, often undesirable), while retaining enough precision to achieve
good results.
For example, consider a script obtained from the code in Figure 4.1 via simple obfuscation
techniques: renaming of variables and function names, introduction of comments, and
randomization of whitespace. Clearly, we want Revolver to consider these scripts as similar.
Making this decision can be non-trivial when inspecting the source code of the scripts.
In fact, as a simple validation, we ran Moss, a system for determining the similarity of
programs, which is often used as a plagiarism detection tool [96], on the original script
and the one obtained via obfuscation. Moss failed to flag the two scripts as similar, as
shown in the tool’s output here [72]. However, the two scripts are identical when their
AST representations are considered, since, in the trees, variables are represented by generic
VAR nodes, independently of their names, and comments and whitespaces are ignored.
This makes tree-based code similarity approaches more suitable for malicious JavaScript
comparisons (and this is the reason why our analysis leverages ASTs as well). However, as
shown in §4.2.4, we need to treat malicious code in a way that is different from previous
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techniques targeting benign codebases. Below, we describe our approach and necessary
extensions in more detail.
Revolver transforms the AST produced by the JavaScript compiler into a normalized node
sequence, which is the sequence of node types obtained by performing a pre-order visit of
the tree. In total, there are 88 distinct node types, corresponding to different constructs of the
JavaScript language. Examples of the node types include IF, WHILE, and ASSIGN nodes.
Figure 4.4 summarizes the data structures used by Revolver during its processing. We
discuss sequence summaries in the next Section.
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Figure 4.4: Data structures used by Revolver.
4.2.3 Similarity Detection
After extracting an AST and transforming it in its normalized node sequence, Revolver
finds similar normalized node sequences. The result is a list of normalized node sequence
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pairs. In particular, pairs of malicious sequences are compared to identify cases of evolution;
pairs where one of the sequences is benign and the other malicious are analyzed to identify
possible evasion attempts.
The similarity computation is based on computing the directed edit distance between
two node sequences, which, intuitively, corresponds to the number of operations that are
required to transform one benign sequence into the malicious one. Before discussing the
actual similarity measurement, we discuss a number of minimization techniques that we use
to make the computation of the similarity score feasible in datasets comprising millions of
node sequences.
Deduplication. As a first step to reduce the number of similarity computations, we
discard duplicates in our dataset of normalized node sequences. Since we use a canonical
representation for the ASTs, we can easily and efficiently compute hashes of each sequence,
which enables us to quickly identify groups of identical node sequences. In the remaining
processing phases, we only need to consider one member of a group of identical node
sequences (rather than all of its elements). Notice that identical normalized node sequences
may correspond to different scripts, and may also have a different detection classification (we
describe such cases in §4.2.5). Therefore, throughout this processing, we always maintain
the association between node sequences and the scripts they correspond to, and whether they
have been classified as malicious or benign.
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Approximate nearest neighbors. Given a repository of n benign ASTs andmmalicious
ones, Revolver needs to compute n×m comparisons over (potentially long) node sequences.
Even after the deduplication step, this may require a significantly large number of operations.
To address this problem, we introduce the idea of sequence summaries. A sequence
summary is a compact summarization of a regular normalized node sequence, which stores
the number of times each node type appears in the corresponding AST. Since there are
88 distinct node types, each node sequence is mapped into a point in an 88-dimensional
Euclidean space. An advantage of sequence summaries is that they bound the length of the
objects that will be compared (from potentially very large node sequences, corresponding to
large ASTs, down to more manageable vectors of fixed length).
Then, for each sequence summary s, we identify its malicious neighbors, that is, up to k
malicious sequence summaries t, such that the distance between s and t is less than a chosen
threshold τn. Intuitively, the malicious neighbors correspond to the set of ASTs that we
expect to be most similar to a given AST. Determining the malicious neighbors of a sequence
summary is an instance of the k-nearest neighbor search problem, for which various efficient
algorithms have been proposed. In particular, we solve it by using the FLANN library [73].
In the remaining step, we compare sequence summaries only with their malicious
neighbors, thus dramatically reducing the number of comparison to be performed.
Normalized node sequence similarity. Finally, we can compute the similarity between
two normalized node sequences. More precisely, Revolver compares the normalized node
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sequence corresponding to a sequence summary swith each normalized node sequence that
corresponds to a sequence summary of the malicious neighbors of s.
The similarity measurement is based on the pattern matching algorithm by Ratcliff et
al. [89]. More precisely, given two node sequences, a and b, we first find their longest
contiguous common subsequence (LCCS). Then, we recursively search for LCCS between
the pieces of a and b to the left and right of the matching subsequence. The similarity of
a and b is then returned as the number of nodes in common divided by the total number
of nodes in the malicious node sequence. Therefore, identical ASTs will have similarity
1, and the similarity values decrease toward zero as two ASTs contain higher amounts of
different nodes. This technique is robust against injections, where one benign script includes
a malicious one, since all malicious nodes will be matched.
In addition to a numeric similarity score, the algorithm also provides a list of insertions
for the two node sequences, that is, a list of AST nodes that would need to be added to one
sequence to transform it into the other one. This information is very useful for our analysis,
since it identifies the actual code that was added to an original malicious code.
After the similarity score is computed, we discard any pairs that have a similarity below a
predetermined threshold τs.
Expansion. Once pairs of ASTs with high similarity have been identified, we need to
determine the Oracle’s classification of the scripts they originate from. We, therefore, expand
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out any pairs that we deduplicated in the initial Deduplication step so that we associate the
AST similarities to the scripts that they correspond to.
4.2.4 Optimizations
There are several techniques that we utilize to improve the results produced by the similarity
detection steps. In particular, our objective is to restrict the pairs identified as similar to
“interesting” ones, i.e., those that are more likely to correspond to evasion attempts or
significant new functionality. The techniques introduced here build upon tree-based code
similarity approaches and are specific to malicious JavaScript.
Size matters. We observed that JavaScript code contains a lot of very small scripts. In
the extreme case, it includes scripts comprising a single statement. We determined that
the majority of such scripts are generated dynamically through calls to eval(), which,
for example, dynamically invoke a second function. Such tiny scripts are problematic for
our analysis: they have not enough functionality to perform malicious actions and they
end up matching other short scripts, but their similarity is not particularly relevant. As a
consequence, we combine ASTs that contain less than a set number of nodes (τz). We do
this by taking into account how a script was generated: if another script generated code
under our threshold, we inline the generated script back to its parent. If the script was not
dynamically generated, then we treat it as if one script contained all static code under our
74
Chapter 4. An Automated Approach to the Detection of EvasiveWeb-basedMalware
threshold. This way the attacker cannot split the malicious code into multiple parts under
our threshold in order to evade Revolver.
Repeated pattern detection. We also observed that, in certain cases, an AST may contain
a set of nodes repeated a large number of times. This commonly occurs when the script
uses some JavaScript data structure that yields many repeated AST nodes. For example,
malicious scripts that unpack or deobfuscate their exploit payload frequently utilize a
JavaScript Array of elements to store the payload. Their ASTs contain a node for every single
element in the Array, which, in many cases, may have thousands of instances. An unwanted
consequence, then, is that any script with a large Array will be considered similar to the
malicious script (due to the high similarity of the array nodes), regardless of the presence
of a decoding/unpacking routine (which, instead, is critical to determine the similarity of
the scripts from a functional point of view). These obfuscation artifacts affect tree-based
similarity algorithms, which will result in the detection of similar code pairs where the
common parts are of no interest in the context of malicious JavaScript. To avoid this problem,
we identify sequences of nodes that are repeated in a script more than a threshold (τp) and
truncate them.
Similarity fragmentation. Although we have identified blocks of code that are shared
across two scripts, it can be the case that these blocks are not continuous. One script can be
broken down into small fragments that are matched to the other script in different positions.
This is why we take into account the fragmentation of the matching blocks. To prune these
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cases, we recognize a similarity only if the fragmentation of the similarities is below a set
threshold τf .
4.2.5 Classification
The outcome of the previous similarity detection step is a list of pairs of scripts that are
similar. As we show in §4.4.1 we can have hundreds of thousands of similar pairs. Therefore,
Revolver performs a classification step of similar pairs. That is, Revolver interprets the
changes that were made between two scripts and classifies them. There are two cases,
depending on the Oracle’s classification of the scripts in a pair. If the pair consists solely of
malicious scripts, then we classify the similarity as a malicious evolution. The other case is a
pair in which one script is malicious and one script is benign. We call such pairs candidate
pairs (they need to be further tested before we can classify their differences). While the
similarity detection has operated on a syntactic level (essentially, by comparing AST nodes),
Revolver now attempts to determine the semantics of the differences.
In practice, Revolver classifies the scripts and their similarities into one of several
categories, corresponding to different cases where an Oracle may flag differently scripts that
are similar. Table 4.1 summarizes the classification algorithm used by Revolver.
Data-dependency category. Revolver checks if a pair of scripts belongs to the data-
dependency category. A typical example of scripts that fall into this category is packers.
Packers are tools that allow JavaScript authors to deliver their code in a packed format,
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AST Executed nodes Classification
= ∗ Data-dependency
∗ = Data-dependency
B ⊆M 6= JavaScript injection
M ⊆ B 6= Evasion
6= 6= General evolution
Table 4.1: Candidate pairs classification (B is a benign sequence,M is a malicious
sequence, ∗ indicates a wildcard value).
significantly reducing the size of the code. In packed scripts, the original code of the script is
stored as a compacted string or array, and its clear-text version is retrieved at run-time by
executing an unpacking routine. Packers have legitimate uses (mostly, size compression):
in fact, several open-source popular packers exist [26], and they are frequently used to
distribute packed version of legitimate JavaScript libraries, such as jQuery. However,
malware authors also rely on these very same packers to obfuscate their code and make it
harder to be fingerprinted.
Notice that the ASTs of packed scripts (generated by the same packer) are identical,
independently of their (unpacked) payload: in fact, they consist of the nodes of the unpacking
routine (which is fixed) and of the nodes holding the packed data (typically, the assignment
77
Chapter 4. An Automated Approach to the Detection of EvasiveWeb-basedMalware
of a string literal to a variable). However, the actual packed contents, which eventually
determine whether the script is malicious or benign, are not retained at the AST level of the
packer, but the packed content will eventually determine the nature of the overall script as
benign or malicious.
Revolver categorizes as data-dependent pairs of scripts that are identical and have different
detection classification.
As a slight variation to this scenario, Revolver also classifies as data-dependent pairs of
scripts for which the ASTs are not identical, but the set of nodes that were actually executed
are indeed the same. For example, this corresponds to cases where a function is added to the
packer but is never actually executed during the unpacking.
Control-flow differences. The remaining categories are based on the analysis of AST
nodes that are different in the two scripts, and, specifically, of nodes representing control-flow
statement. We focus on such nodes because they give an attacker a natural way to implement
a check designed to evade detection. In fact, such checks generally test a condition and
modify the control flow depending on the result of the test.
More precisely, we consider the following control-flow related nodes: TRY, CATCH,
CALL, WHILE, FOR, IF, ELSE, HOOK, BREAK, THROW, SWITCH, CASE, CONTINUE,
RETURN, LT (<), LE (<=), GT (>), GE (>=), EQ (==) , NE (! =), SHEQ (===), SNE
(! ==), AND, and OR. Depending on where these control-flow nodes were added, whether
in the benign or in the malicious script, a candidate pair can be classified as a JavaScript
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injection or an evasion. Notice that we leverage here the execution bits to detect control flow
changes that were actually executed and affected the execution of code that was found as
malicious before.
JavaScript injection category. In some cases, malware authors insert malicious JavaScript
code into existing benign scripts on a compromised host. This is done because, when
investigating a compromise, webmasters may neglect to inspect files that are familiar to
them, and thus such injections can go undetected. In particular, it is common for malware
authors to add their malicious scripts to the code of popular JavaScript libraries hosted on a
compromised site, such as jQuery and SWFObject.
In these cases, Revolver identifies similarities between a benign script (the original,
legitimate jQuery code) and a malicious script (the library with the added malicious code). In
addition, Revolver detects that the difference between the two scripts is due to the presence
of control-flow nodes in the malicious script (the additional code added to the library), which
are missing in the benign script. Revolver classifies such similarities as JavaScript injections,
since the classification of the analyzed script changes from benign to malicious due to the
introduction of additional code in the malicious version of the script.
Evasions category. Pairs of scripts that only differ because of the presence of additional
control-flow nodes in the benign script are categorized as evasions. In fact, these correspond
to cases where a script, which was originally flagged as malicious by an Oracle, is modified
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to include some additional functionality that modifies its control flow (i.e., an evasive check)
and, as a consequence, appears to be benign to the Oracle.
General evolution cases. Finally, if none of the previous categories applies to the current
pair of scripts, it means that their differences are caused by the insertion of control-flow
nodes in both the benign and malicious scripts. Unlike similarities in the evasion category,
these similarities may signify generic evolution between the two scripts. Revolver flags
these cases for manual review, at a lower priority than evasive cases.
4.3 Implementation
In this section, we discuss specific implementation choices for our approach.
We used the Wepawet honeyclient [18] as the Oracle of Revolver. In particular, the input
to Revolver was the web pages processed by the Wepawet tool at real-time together with
their detection classification. We used Revolver to extract ASTs from the pages analyzed by
Wepawet, and to perform the similarity processing described in the previous sections.
As our processing infrastructure, we used a cluster of four worker machines to process
submissions in parallel with the Oracle. Notice that all the steps in Revolver’s processing
can be easily parallelized. In terms of performance, we managed to process up to 591,543
scripts on a single day, which was the maximum number of scripts that we got on a single
day from the Oracle during our experiments.
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We will now discuss the parameters that can be tuned in our algorithms (discussed in
§4.2), explaining the concrete values we have chosen for our experiments.
Minimum tree size (τz). We chose 25 nodes as the minimum size of the AST trees that
we will process before combining them to their parent. Smaller ASTs can result from calls
to eval with tiny arguments, and from calls to short event handlers, such as onLoad and
onMouseOver. We expect that such small ASTs correspond to short scripts that do not
implement any interesting functionality alone, but complement the functionality of their
parent script.
Minimum pattern size (τp). Another threshold that we set is the minimum pattern size.
Any node sequence that is repeated more than this threshold is truncated to the threshold
value. The primary application of pattern detection is to handle similar packers that decode
payloads of different size. We chose 16 for this value, as current packers either work on
relatively long arrays (longer than 16, and thus detected) or on single strings (one node,
and thus irrelevant to this issue). This amount also excludes the possibility of compressing
interesting code sequences, since we rarely see such long patterns outside of packed payloads.
Reducing this value would have the effect of making the tree similarity algorithm much
more lax.
Nearest neighbor threshold (τn). In the nearest neighbors computation, we discard node
sequences that are farther than a given distance d from the node sequence currently being
inspected. We empirically determined a value for this parameter, by evaluating various
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Figure 4.5: Number of detected similarities as a function of the distance threshold.
Figure 4.6: The resulting amount of similarities for different similarity thresholds.
values for d and inspecting the resulting similarities. From Figure 4.5, it is apparent that
the amount of similarities that are detected levels off fairly sharply past d = 1, 000. We
determined that 10, 000 is a safe threshold that includes a majority of trees while allowing
the similarity calculation to be computationally feasible.
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Normalized node sequence similarity threshold (τs). Care has to be taken when choos-
ing the threshold used to identify similar normalized node sequences. Intuitively, if this
value is too low, we risk introducing significant noise into our analysis, which will make
Revolver consider as similar scripts that in reality are not related to each other. On the
contrary, if the value is too high, it will discard interesting similarities. Experimentally (see
Figure 4.6), we determined that this occurs for similarity values in the 70%–80% interval.
Therefore, we chose 75% as our similarity threshold (in other words, only node sequences
that are 75% or more similar are further considered by Revolver).
4.4 Evaluation
We evaluated the ability of Revolver to aid in detecting evasive changes to malicious scripts
in real-world scenarios. While Revolver can be leveraged to solve other problems, we feel
that automatically identifying evasions is the most important contribution to improving the
detection of web-based malware.
4.4.1 Evasions in the wild
Revolver identifies possible evasion attempts by identifying similarities between malicious
and benign code. Therefore, Revolver’s input is the output of any Oracle that classifies
JavaScript code as either malicious or benign. To evaluate Revolver, we continuously
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Category
Similar
Scripts
# Groups
by malicious AST
JavaScript Injections 6,996 701
Data-dependencies 101,039 475
Evasions 4,147 155
General evolutions 2,490 273
Total 114,672 1,604
Table 4.2: Benign scripts from Wepawet that have similarities with malicious scripts and
their classification from Revolver.
submitted to Revolver all web pages that Wepawet examined. Since September 2012,
we collected 6, 468, 623 web pages out of which 265, 692 were malicious. We analyzed
20, 732, 766 total benign scripts and 186, 032 total malicious scripts. Out of these scripts,
we obtained 705, 472 unique benign ASTs and 5, 701 unique malicious ASTs.
Revolver applied the AST similarity analysis described in Section 4.2, and extracted the
pairs of similar ASTs. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of classifying these similarities
in the categories considered by Revolver. In particular, Revolver identified 6, 996 scripts
where malicious JavaScript was injected, 101, 039 scripts with data-dependencies, 4, 147
evasive scripts, and 2, 490 scripts as general evolutions. We observe that many of these
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scripts can be easily grouped by their similarities with the same malicious script. Therefore,
for ease of analysis, we group the pairs by their malicious AST component, and identify
701 JavaScript injections, 475 data-dependencies, 155 evasions, and 273 general evolutions.
Our results indicate a high number of malicious scripts that share similarities with benign
ones. This is due to the fact that injections and data-dependent malicious scripts naturally
share similarities with benign scripts and we are observing many of these attacks in the wild.
To verify the results produced by Revolver, we manually analyzed all groups categorized
as “evasions”. For the rest of the categories we grouped the malicious ASTs into families
based on their similarities with each other and examined a few similar pairs from each family.
We found the results for the JavaScript injection and data-dependencies categories to be
correct. The reason why Revolver classified a large number of scripts as data-dependencies
is due to the extensive use of a few popular packers, such as the Edwards’ packer [26]. For
example, the jQuery library was previously officially distributed in a packed state to reduce
its size.
Of the 155 evasions groups, we found that only five were not intended evasion attempts.
We cannot describe all evasions in detail here, but we provide a brief summary for the most
interesting ones in the next section.
The pairs in the “general evolutions” category consisted of cases where Revolver identified
control flow changes in both the benign and malicious scripts. We manually looked into
them and did not find any behavior that could be classified as evasive.
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4.4.2 Evasions case studies
The evasions presented here exploit differences in the implementation of Wepawet’s
JavaScript interpreter and the one used by regular browsers. Notice that these evasions can
affect Oracles other than Wepawet; in particular, low-interaction honeyclients, such as the
popular jsunpack [41] and PhoneyC [75].
We describe in more detail a subset of the evasions that we found from our experiment
on real-world data. In the 22 evasion groups described here, we identified seven distinct
evasion techniques, and one programming mistake in a malicious PDF.
We found three cases which leveraged subtle details in the handling of regular expressions
and Unicode to cause a failure in a deobfuscation routine when executing in the Oracle (on
the contrary, regular browsers would not be affected). In another case, the attackers replaced
the JavaScript code used to launch an ActiveX exploit code with equivalent VBScript code.
This is done because Internet Explorer can interpret VBScript, while most emulators do not
support it. In a different case, the evasive code creates a div tag and checks for specific
CSS properties, which are set correctly in Internet Explorer but not when executing in our
Oracle. We will examine in more detail the next four evasion techniques.
Variable scope inside eval. We found that a successful evasion attack can be launched
with minor changes to a malicious script. In one such case, shown in Figure 4.7, the authors
of the malicious script changed a replace call with a call to eval, which, in turn, executed
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1 // Malicious
2 function foo() {
3 ...
4 W6Kh6V5E4 = W6Kh6V5E4.replace(/\W/g,Bm2v5BSJE);
5 ...
6 }
7 // Evasion
8 function foo(){
9 ...
10 var enryA = mxNEN+F7B07;
11 F7B07 = eval;
12 {}
13 enryA = F7B07('enryA.rep' + 'lace(/\\W/g,CxFHg)');
14 ...
15 }
Figure 4.7: Evasion based on differences in the scope handling inside eval in different
JavaScript engines.
the same replace. While this change did not affect the functionality of the script in Internet
Explorer, it did change it for our Oracle. In fact, in Wepawet’s JavaScript engine, the code
inside the eval runs in a different scope, and thus, the locally-defined variable on which
replace is called is not accessible. While the code successfully exploits Internet Explorer, it
fails in our Oracle and is marked as benign.
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Figure 4.8: Timeline of PDF evasions automatically detected by Revolver.
Adobe-specific JavaScript execution. Figure 4.9 shows an evasion that leverages a
specific characteristic of the JavaScript engine implementation included in Adobe Reader.
In particular, in Adobe’s engine (unlike other engines), the eval function is accessible as a
property of native objects, e.g., a string (line 8) [3]. Wepawet’s analyzer is not aware of this
difference and fails on scripts that make use of this feature (marking them as benign). The
functionally-identical script that does not use this trick, but directly invokes the eval()
function, is correctly marked as malicious. We also found several instances of evasions
related to PDF specific objects, like app and target, where missing functionality was used to
render the malicious script harmless. We show a snippet of this evasion type found in the
wild in Figure 4.10.
In Figure 4.8 we see the evasions related to the app object that were automatically detected
by Revolver as found in the wild. Every time Revolver detected an evasion there is a spike in
the figure, and we made the appropriate patches to Wepawet as soon as possible. What is of
particular interest is the fact that attackers react to Wepawet’s patching by introducing a new
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1 // Malicious
2 OlhG='evil_code'
3 wTGB4=eval
4 wTGB4(OlhG)
5
6 // Evasion
7 OlhG='evil_code'
8 wTGB4="this"["eval"]
9 wTGB4(OlhG)
Figure 4.9: Evasion based on the ability to access the eval function as a property of native
objects in Adobe’s JavaScript engine.
1 if((app.setInterval+/**/"")["indexOf"](aa)!=-1){
2 a=/**/target.creationDate.split('|')[0];}
Figure 4.10: Evasion based on PDF specific objects app and target.
evasion within a few days, making a tool like Revolver necessary to automatically keep track
of this behavior and keep false negative detections as low as possible.
Evasion through exceptions. Another interesting evasion that Revolver found also
leverages subtle differences in the JavaScript implementation used in Wepawet and in real
browsers. In this case, the malicious script consists of a decryption function and a call to
that function. The function first initializes a variable with a XOR key, which will be used
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to decrypt a string value (encoding a malicious payload). The decoded payload is then
evaluated via eval.
The evasion that we found follows the same pattern (see Figure 4.11), but with a few
critical changes. In the modified code, the variable containing the XOR key is only initialized
the first time that the decryption function runs; in sequential runs, the value of the key is
modified in a way that depends on its prior value (Lines 16–17). After the key computation, a
global variable is accessed. This variable is not defined the first time the decryption function
is called, so that the function exits with an exception (Line 19). On Internet Explorer, this
exception is caught, the variable is defined, and the decryption function is called again. The
function then runs through the key calculation and then decrypts and executes the encrypted
code by calling eval.
On our Oracle, a subtle bug (again, in the handling of eval calls) in the JavaScript engine
caused the function to throw an exception the first two times that it was called. When the
function is called the third time, it finally succeeds, modifies the XOR key, and attempts to
decrypt the string. However, since the key calculation is run three times instead of two, the
key is incorrect, and the decrypted string results in garbage data. We found three variations
of this technique in our experiments.
A very interesting exception-based evasion that we found with Revolver was based on the
immutability of window.document.body. The attacker checks if she can replace the body
object with a string, something that should not be possible and should result in an exception,
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but it does not raise an exception in our Oracle because the body object is mutable. The
interesting part is that we found three completely different malicious scripts evolving to
incorporate this evasion, one of them being part of the popular exploit kit Blackhole 2.0.
This is the first indication that evasion techniques are propagating to different attacking
components and indicates that attackers care to keep their attacks as stealthy as possible.
Unicode deobfuscation evasion. This evasion leveraged the fact that Unicode strings
in string initializations and regular expressions are treated differently by different JavaScript
engines. For example, Revolver found two scripts with a similarity of 82.6%. The script
flagged as benign contained an additional piece of code that modified the way a function
reference to evalwas computed. More precisely, the benign script computed the reference
by performing a regular expression replacement. While this operation executes correctly in
Internet Explorer, it causes an error in the JavaScript engine used by Wepawet due to a bug
in the implementation of regular expressions.
Incorrect PDF version check. Another similarity that Revolver identified involved two
scripts contained inside two PDF files, one flagged as benign by Wepawet and the other as
malicious. These scripts had a similarity of 99.7%. We determined that the PDF contained
an exploit targeting Adobe Reader with versions between 7.1 and 9. The difference found
by Revolver was caused by an incorrect version check in the exploit code. The benign
code mistakenly checked for version greater or equal to 9 instead of less or equal to 9,
which combined with the previous checks for the version results in an impossible browser
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configuration and as a consequence the exploit was never fired. This case, instead of being
an actual evasion, is the result of a mistake performed by the attacker. However, the authors
quickly fixed their code and re-submitted it to Wepawet just 13 minutes after the initial,
flawed submission.
False positives. The evasion groups contained five false positives. In this context, a false
positive means that the similarity identified by Revolver is not responsible for the Oracle’s
misdetection. More precisely, of these false positives, four corresponded to cases where the
script execution terminated due to runtime JavaScript errors before the actual exploit was
launched. While such behavior could be evasive in nature, we determined that the errors
were not caused by any changes in the code, but by other dependencies. These can be due
to missing external resources required by the exploit or because of a runtime error. In the
remaining case, the control-flow change identified by Revolver was not responsible for the
misdetection of the script.
Revolver’s impact on honeyclients. By continuously running Revolver in parallel with
a honeyclient, we can improve the honeyclient’s accuracy by observing the evolution of
malicious JavaScript. The results from such an integration with Wepawet indicate a shift in
the attackers’ efforts from hardening their obfuscation techniques to finding discrepancies
between analysis systems and targeted browsers. Popular exploit kits like Blackhole are
adopting evasions to avoid detection, which shows that such evasions have emerged as a new
problem in the detection of malicious web pages. Revolver’s ability to pinpoint, with high
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accuracy, these new techniques out of millions of analyzed scripts not only gives a unique
view into the attackers’ latest steps, but indicates the necessity of such system as part of any
honeyclient that analyzes web malware.
4.5 Discussion
As with any detection method, malware authors could find ways to attempt to evade
Revolver. One possibility consists in splitting the malicious code into small segments,
each of which would be interpreted separately through eval. Revolver is resilient against
code fragmentation like this because it combines such scripts back to the parent script that
generated them, reconstructing this way the original non-fragmented script.
It is also possible for malware authors to purposefully increase the Euclidean distance
between their scripts so that otherwise similar scripts are no longer considered neighbors by
the nearest neighbor algorithm. For example, malware authors could swap statements in
their code, or inject junk code that has no effect other than decreasing the similarity score.
Attackers could also create fully metamorphic scripts, similar to what some binary malware
does [56]. We can counteract these attacks by improving the algorithms we use to compute
the similarity of scripts. For example, we could use a preprocessing step to normalize a
script’s code (e.g., removing dead code). A completely different approach would be to
leverage Revolver to correlate differences in the code of the same web pages when visited by
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multiple oracles: if Revolver detects significant differences in the code returned during these
visits, then we can identify metamorphic web pages. In addition, metamorphic code raises
the bar, since an attack needs to be programmatically different every time, and the code must
be automatically generated without clearly-detectable patterns. Therefore, this would force
attackers to give up their current obfuscation techniques and ability to reuse code.
An attacker could include an evasion and dynamically generate the attack code only if the
evasion is successful. The attacker has two options: He can include the evasion code as the
first step of the attack, or after initial obfuscation and environment setup. Evasions are hard
to find and require significant manual effort by the attackers. Therefore, attackers will not
reveal their evasion techniques since they are almost as valuable as the exploits they deliver.
Moreover, introducing unobfuscated code compromises the stealthiness of the attack and
can yield into detection through signature matching. The second option works in Revolver’s
favor, since it allows our system to detect similarities in obfuscation and in environmental
setup code.
Finally, an operational drawback of Revolver is the fact that manual inspection of the
similarities that it identifies is currently needed to confirm the results it produces. The
number of similarities that were found during our experiments made it possible to perform
such manual analysis. In the future, we plan to build tools to support the inspection of
similarities and to automatically confirm similarities based on previous analyses.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced and demonstrated Revolver, a novel approach and tool
for detecting malicious JavaScript code similarities on a large scale. Revolver’s approach is
based on identifying scripts that are similar and taking into account an Oracle’s classification
of every script. By doing this, Revolver can pinpoint scripts that have high similarity but are
classified differently (detecting likely evasion attempts) and improve the accuracy of the
Oracle.
We performed a large-scale evaluation of Revolver by running it in parallel with the
popular Wepawet drive-by-detection tool. We identified several cases of evasions that are
used in the wild to evade this tool (and, likely, other tools based on similar techniques) and
fixed them, improving this way the accuracy of the honeyclient.
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1 // Malicious
2 function deobfuscate(){
3 ... // Define var xorkey and compute its value
4 for(...) { ... // XOR decryption with xorkey }
5 eval(deobfuscated_string);
6 }
7 try {
8 eval('deobfuscate();')
9 }
10 catch (e){
11 alert('err');
12 }
13
14 // Evasion
15 function deobfuscate(){
16 try { ... // is variable xorkey defined? }
17 catch(e){ xorkey=0; }
18 ... // Compute value of xorkey
19 VhplKO8 += 0; // throws exception the first time
20 for(...) { ... // XOR decryption with xorkey}
21 eval(deobfuscated_string);
22 }
23 try { eval('deobfuscate();') } // 1st call
24 catch (e){
25 // Variable VhplKO8 is not defined
26 try {
27 VhplKO8 = 0; // define variable
28 eval('deobfuscate();'); // 2nd call
29 }
30 catch (e){
31 alert('ere');
32 }
33 }
Figure 4.11: An evasion taking advantage of a subtle bug in Wepawet’s JavaScript engine in
order to protect the XOR key.
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Chapter 5
Eliciting Malicious Behavior in
Browser Extensions
In this chapter we focus on a different threat against the browser: malicious extensions.
We present Hulk, a dynamic analysis system that detects malicious behavior in browser
extensions by monitoring their execution and corresponding network activity. Hulk elicits
malicious behavior in extensions in two ways: HoneyPages, which are dynamic pages that
adapt to an extension’s expectations in web page structure and content, and fuzzing so that
we can exercise the numerous event handlers that modern extensions heavily rely upon.
All major web browsers today support broad extension ecosystems that allow third parties
to install a wide range of modified behavior or additional functionality. Internet Explorer
has binary add-ons (Browser Helper Objects), while Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Safari
support JavaScript-based extensions. Some browsers have online web stores to distribute
extensions to users. For example, the most popular extension in Chrome’s Web Store,
AdBlock, has over 10 million users. Other popular extensions serve a variety of functions,
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such as preserving privacy, changing the aesthetics of the browser’s UI, or integrating with
web services such as Google Translate.
The amount of critical and private data that web browsers mediate continues to increase,
and naturally this data has become a target for criminals. In addition, the web’s advertising
ecosystem offers opportunities to profit by manipulating a user’s everyday browsing behavior.
As a result, malicious browser extensions have become a new threat, as criminals realize
the potential to monetize a victim’s web browsing session and readily access web-related
content and private data.
Our work examines extensions for Google Chrome that are designed with malicious
intent—a threat distinct from that posed by attackers exploiting bugs in benign extensions,
which has seen prior study [9, 15]. Extensions for Google Chrome are primarily distributed
through the Chrome Web Store.1 Like app stores for other platforms, such as Android or
iOS, inherent risks arise when downloading and executing programs from untrusted sources.
Reports have documented not only malicious extensions [98], but miscreants purchasing
extensions (and thereby access to their userbases via update mechanisms) to add malicious
functionality [4, 90]. In addition to the web store, extensions can also be directly installed by
users and other programs. Installed by a process called sideloading, these extensions pose a
recognized risk that browser vendors have attempted to prevent through modifications to the
browser [62]. Sideloaded extensions are especially problematic since they can be installed
1https://chrome.google.com/webstore/category/extensions
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without user knowledge, and are not subject to review by a web store. Despite efforts to
stifle sideloaded extensions, they remain a significant problem [27].
In this chapter we present Hulk, a tool for detecting malicious behavior in Google Chrome
extensions. Hulk relies on dynamic execution of extensions and uses several techniques
to trigger malicious functionality during execution. One technique we developed to elicit
malicious behavior is the use of HoneyPages: specially-crafted web pages designed to
satisfy the structural conditions that trigger a given extension. We interpose on all queries
and modifications to the DOM tree of the HoneyPage to automatically create elements and
mimic DOM tree structures for extensions on the fly. Using this technique, we can readily
observe malicious behavior that inserts new iframe or div elements.
In addition, we built a fuzzer to drive the execution of event handlers registered by
extensions. In our experiments, we use the fuzzer to trigger all event handlers associated
with web requests, exercising each with 1 million URLs. Although we undertook extensive
efforts to trigger malicious behavior, the possibility remains that Hulk lacks the mechanisms
to satisfy all of the conditions necessary for eliciting an extension’s malicious behavior.
Our analysis of 48,332 Chrome extensions found that malicious extensions pose a serious
threat to users. By developing a set of rules that label execution logs from Hulk, we identified
130 malicious extensions and 4,712 “suspicious” extensions, most of which appear in the
Chrome Web Store. Several large classes of malicious behavior appear within our set of
extensions: affiliate fraud, credential theft, ad injection or replacement, and social network
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abuse. In one case, an extension performing ad replacement had nearly 2 million users,
similar in size to some of the largest botnets.
In summary, we frame our contributions as follows:
• We present Hulk, a system to perform dynamic analysis for Chrome extensions.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of HoneyPages and event handler fuzzing to elicit
malicious behavior in browser extensions.
• We perform the first broad study of malicious Chrome extensions.
• We characterize several classes of malicious Chrome extensions, some with very large
footprints (up to 5.5M installations) and propose solutions to eliminate entire classes of
malicious behavior.
5.1 Background
We begin by reviewing the Google Chrome extension model and the opportunities this model
provides to malicious extensions.
5.1.1 Chrome Extension Composition
Google Chrome supports extensions written in JavaScript and HTML (distributed as a single
zip file). A small number of extensions also include binary code plugins, although these
are subject to a manual security review process [38]. Each extension contains a (mandatory)
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manifest that, along with other extension parameters, describes the permissions the extension
uses and the list of resources that the browser should load.
The permission system is designed in the spirit of least privilege, with the goal of limiting
the resources available to an extension in case it has exploitable vulnerabilities [9]. The
threat model does not attempt to address malicious extensions accessing sensitive content or
performing other actions. The permission system determines which sites an extension can
access, the allowed API calls, and the use of binary plugins. We describe relevant parts of
the permission system later in this section. See Barth et al. for a more detailed description of
Chrome’s extension architecture [9].
5.1.2 Installing Extensions
The Chrome Web Store is the official means for users to find and install extensions. The Web
Store is similar to other app stores, such as those for iOS and Android, in that developers
create extensions and upload them to the store for users to download. Extension developers
can also push out updates without requiring any action by the end-user.
In addition to the Chrome Web Store, extensions can also be installed manually by a
user or an external program. We refer to the installation of extensions outside the web
store as sideloading. Chrome version 25 (released February, 2013) included changes to
prevent silent installation of Chrome extensions and require that the user indicate consent
for installation [62]. In May, 2014, Chrome took further steps to prevent sideloading by
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requiring all installed extensions to be hosted in the Chrome Web Store [50]. While these
changes increase the difficulty of sideloading, it is still possible for programs to force silent
installation of extensions, since the attacker already has control of the machine. For our
study we obtained a set of extensions that are sideloaded into Chrome by other Windows
programs, many of which are known malware.
5.1.3 Extension Permissions
Permissions. Chrome requires extensions to list the permissions needed to access the
different parts of the extension API. For example, Figure 5.1 shows a portion of a man-
ifest file requesting permission to access the webRequest and cookies API. The
webRequest permission allows the extension to “observe and analyze traffic and to
intercept, block, or modify requests in-flight” by allowing the extension to register callbacks
associated with different parts of the HTTP stack [38]. Similarly, the cookies API allows the
extension to get, set, and be notified of changes to cookies.
The extension API permissions operate in conjunction with the optional host permissions,
which limit the API permissions to access resources only for the specified URLs. For example,
in Figure 5.1 the extension requests host permissions forhttps://www.google.com/,
which allows it to access cookies and webRequest APIs for the specified domains.
Host permissions also support wildcarding URLs. In Figure 5.1, the extension requests
access to *://*.facebook.com. This permission allows for access to all subdomains
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...
"permissions": [
"cookies",
"webRequest",
"*://*.facebook.com/",
"https://www.google.com/"
],
...
"content_scripts": [
{
"matches": ["http://www.yahoo.com/*"],
"js": ["jquery.js", "myscript.js"]
}
],
...
"background": {
"scripts": ["background.js"]
},
...
"content_security_policy": "script-src 'self'
http://www.foo.com 'unsafe-eval';"
...
Figure 5.1: Example of a manifest that shows API permissions for two hosts, followed by
content scripts that run on http://www.yahoo.com, followed by a background script
that runs on all pages. Finally, the CSP specifies the ability to include and eval scripts in
the extension from foo.com.
of facebook.com requested via any URL scheme. In addition to wildcards, the special
token <all urls>matches any URL.
Besides the permissions described above, we found that extensions request a variety of
other permissions. In Section 5.3 we summarize the permissions requested for all of the
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extensions we examined, and we discuss the permissions relevant to various types of abuse in
Section 5.4. Other resources provide a thorough analysis of the Chrome permission system
[9, 15].
Content Scripts. In addition to permissions for accessing various resources associated with
a page, extensions can also specify a list ofcontent scripts to indicate JavaScript files
that will run inside of the web page. Figure 5.1 shows an example of including two JavaScript
files, jquery.js and myscript.js that will be run in the context of the page for any
URLs matching the specified URL patterns (all pages on http://www.yahoo.com/
in this example). Inside of each JavaScript file the author can include further logic to decide
if and when to execute.
The ability to run in the context of a page is a powerful feature. Once a content script exe-
cutes, any resulting actions become indistinguishable from actions performed by JavaScript
provided by the web server. Not only can the scripts modify the DOM tree or other scripts,
but they can also issue authenticated web requests (such as POST with proper cookies).
Background Pages. Besides the content scripts that allow an extension to interact with a
given page, Chrome also allows extensions to run scripts in a “background page”. Figure 5.1
shows an example manifest file that specifies background.js as a background page.
Background pages often contain the logic and state an extension needs for the entirety of
the browser session and do not have any visibility to the user. For example, an extension
requesting webRequest permissions may use the background script to attach a listener
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to read outgoing requests using the chrome.webRequest.onBeforeRequest.
addListener() call. After filtering on the host permissions, Chrome will send the
extension a notification for every outgoing request. We detail further examples in the context
of the extensions in the following sections.
Content Security Policy. In general, servers can specify a Content Security Policy (CSP)
header that the browser uses to determine the sources from which it can include objects on
the page. CSP can also specify other options, such as whether to allow the page to perform
an eval or to embed inline JavaScript [107]. Extensions can use the same syntax to express
their CSP in the manifest file. For example, an extension that wishes to include source from
foo.com and to execute eval can specify its CSP as shown in Figure 5.1.
5.2 Architecture
In this section, we describe the architecture of Hulk, our dynamic analysis system that
identifies malicious behavior in Chrome extensions. Hulk dynamically loads extensions
in a monitored environment and observes the interaction of extensions with the loaded
web pages. Using a set of heuristics to identify potentially dangerous behavior, it labels
extensions as malicious, suspicious, or benign. In the rest of this section we describe how
Hulk works and the challenges that arise in analyzing browser extensions.
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5.2.1 Profiling Extensions
At the core of our dynamic analysis system is an instrumented browser and extension
loader that enables us to automatically install extensions and instrument activity during web
browsing. Our monitoring hooks collect data from multiple vantage points within the system
as Hulk visits web pages and triggers a range of extension behavior.
URL Extraction. Before we dynamically analyze an extension we need to ensure that
we can trigger the extension’s functionality. Most extensions interact with the content of
web pages, so we need to choose which URLs to load for our analysis. To this end, we
use three sources of URLs: the manifest, the source code, and a list of popular sites. First,
using the manifest file of the extension we construct valid URLs that match the permissions
and content scripts specified. In some cases, the host permissions of an extension are
restrictive—for example, https://*.facebook.com—so we can generate URLs
that will match the pattern. It is more difficult to pick URLs to visit in cases where the
extension requests host permissions on all URLs (Section 5.1.3), because the malicious
behavior may only trigger on a small subset of sites. Therefore, we search the source code
for any static URLs and visit those as well. Finally, for every extension we also visit a set of
popular sites targeted by malicious extensions. We constantly strive to improve this list as
we detect malicious extensions attacking particular domains. We however note that although
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we use multiple sources of URLs to determine the appropriate pages to visit, our approach is
not complete; we discuss the limitations further in Section 5.6.
HoneyPages. Some extensions activate based on the content of a web page instead of the
URL. To analyze such extensions we use specially crafted pages that attempt to satisfy the
conditions that an extension looks for on a page before performing an action. We call these
HoneyPages. HoneyPages contain JavaScript functions that overload built-in functions that
query the DOM tree of the web page. As a result, when an extension queries for the presence
of a specific element we can automatically create it and insert it into the page. For example,
if the extension queries an iframeDOM element with the intention to alter it, then our
HoneyPage will create an iframe element, inject it in the DOM tree, and return it to the
extension.
HoneyPages enable us to supplement the URL extraction phase and dynamically create
an environment for the extension to perform as many actions as it needs. The on-demand
nature of a HoneyPage does not restrict us to a specific DOM tree structure, but enables us
to determine what an extension looks for in a page during execution, since we can record
all interactions within a HoneyPage. By using HoneyPages we can better understand how
the extension will behave on arbitrary pages that are otherwise difficult to generate prior to
analysis.
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5.2.2 Event-Based Execution
The Chrome browser offers to extensions an event-based model to register callbacks
that respond to certain browser-level events. For example, extensions use the chrome.
webRequest.onBeforeRequest callback to intercept all outgoing HTTP requests
from the browser. HoneyPages will not trigger callbacks for network events that require
special properties, such as a specific URL or HTTP header. Therefore, we complement
HoneyPages with event handler fuzzing. Specifically, we invoke all event callbacks that an
extension registers in the chrome.webRequestAPI with mock event objects. We point
to a HoneyPage loaded in the active tab while invoking the callbacks, enabling us to monitor
the changes that the extension attempts to make on that page. Our approach allows us to test
for every extension the extension’s callbacks on the top 1 million Alexa domains in under
10 seconds on average.
Monitoring Hooks
Browser Extension API. Depending on the permissions included in the manifest (Sec-
tion 5.1.3), an extension can use the Chrome extension API to perform actions not available
to JavaScript running in a web page. As such, monitoring the extension API captures a
subset of the total JavaScript activity that results from an extension, but gives us a detailed
picture of what the extension attempts to do. For example, we monitor the extension API
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and log if the extension registers a callback to intercept all HTTP requests performed by the
browser, and then track the changes that the extension makes to the HTTP requests. To do
this, we leverage the current logging infrastructure offered by Chrome for monitoring the
activity of extensions. We build upon the JavaScript function call logging provided by the
browser to identify malicious behavior, such as tampering of security-related HTTP headers.
Content Scripts. We intercept and log all additional code introduced by the extension in
the context of the visited page. Doing so provides a more complete picture of the extension’s
functionality, since it can include remote scripts from arbitrary locations and inject them
into the page. Remote scripts can compromise the page’s security similar to third-party
JavaScript libraries [77], and make the analysis of the extension more difficult. Using remote
scripts gives miscreants the ability to blacklist IP addresses of our analysis system (i.e.,
cloaking [49, 105]) or return code without the malicious components. Remote JavaScript
inclusion also renders static analysis on the extension’s code fundamentally incomplete
since parts of the extension’s codebase are not available until execution.
Network Logging. We use a transparent proxy that intercepts all browser HTTP and DNS
traffic to log the requests made during extension execution. A browser extension has a set of
files available as resources loaded by the browser, and it can also download and execute
content from the web. Since the URLs retrieved can be computed at runtime, monitoring
the network activity of the extension is critical for a complete analysis of its source code
and included components. In addition to identifying remote content, we log all domains
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contacted by monitoring the DNS requests generated by the browser. Doing so enables
us to identify extensions that contact non-existent domains, which can occur because the
extension is no longer operational or up-to-date. In these cases, our analysis was necessarily
incomplete, since when the domain was active the extension could have fetched more remote
code from it.
5.2.3 Detecting Malicious Behavior
As described in the previous section, our dynamic analysis system can provide detailed
information about all browser and extension activity performed while visiting web pages.
We combine this data to label the extension as either benign, suspicious, or malicious
by applying a set of labeling heuristics based on the behavior. Labeling an extension as
malicious indicates we identified behavior harmful to the user. Suspicious indicates the
presence of potentially harmful actions or exposing the user to new risks, but without
certainty that these represent malicious actions. Finally, when we do not find any suspicious
activity, we label the extension as benign.
JavaScript Attributes
We use our monitoring modules described in Section 5.2.2 to identify malicious JavaScript
execution. Below we detail actions that we consider malicious or suspicious in our post-
processing analysis.
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Extension API. As described earlier, Chrome’s extension API offers privileged access to
additional functionality of the browser besides native JavaScript, using permissions specified
in the manifest file. While there are benign uses for every permission, we found several
extensions that abuse the API. Specifically, for reasons described below, we consider the
following actions available only through the extension API as malicious: uninstalling other
extensions, preventing uninstallation of the current extension, and manipulating HTTP
headers.
We consider uninstalling other extensions as malicious because some extensions uninstall
cleaner extensions, such as the extension Facebook created to remove harmful extensions on
its blacklist.2 We detect this behavior by monitoring the chrome.management.
uninstall API calls. To avoid false positives, we can differentiate cleaners from
malicious extensions because, to the best of our knowledge, cleaners operate in a different
fashion than Antivirus does: they clean up malicious extensions and then remove themselves
from the browser. This differs from the behavior of malicious extensions, which remain
persistent on the system.
Besides attempting to uninstall other extensions, malicious extensions often prevent the
user from uninstalling the extension itself. More specifically, we found extensions that
prevent the user from opening Chrome’s extension configuration page where a user can con-
veniently uninstall any extension. To prevent uninstallation, malicious extensions interfere
2https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/facebook-malicious-
extens/mhkafblddkepdhhjpmedkngigkjjknoa
111
Chapter 5. ElicitingMalicious Behavior in Browser Extensions
with tabs that point to the extension configuration page,chrome://extensions, either
by replacing the URL with a different one, or by removing the tab completely. For analysis,
we load a tab with chrome://extensions in the browser during our dynamic analysis
and monitor any interactions to identify such behavior.
Lastly, using callbacks in the webRequest API, a malicious extension can manipu-
late HTTP headers. Extensions can use the webRequest API to effectively perform a
man-in-the-middle attack on HTTP requests and responses before they are handled by the
browser. This behavior is often malicious (or at least dangerous) since we found exten-
sions that remove security-related headers, such as Content-Security-Policy or X-Frame-
Options, through the use of callbacks such as webRequest.onHeadersReceived
and webRequestInterval.eventHandled. By monitoring the use of this API,
we can log events that reveal state of HTTP headers before and after the request. Upon
manipulation of any security-related headers, we label the extension as malicious.
Interaction with visited pages. In addition to the extension API, we also monitor an
extension’s use of content scripts to modify web content loaded in the browser. In our
analysis, we flag two kinds of interaction: sensitive information theft as malicious and
injection of remote JavaScript content as suspicious.
There are many ways an extension can steal personal information from the user. For
example, it can act as a JavaScript-based keylogger by intercepting all keystrokes on a page.
Extensions can also access form data, such as a password field, before it is encrypted and
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sent over the network. Finally, extensions can also steal sensitive information from third
parties by accessing sites with which the user has a valid session, and either issuing requests
to exfiltrate data, or simply stealing valid authentication tokens.
We label any extension that injects remote JavaScript content into a web page as suspicious.
We define this activity as adding a script element with a src attribute pointing to a
domain that is different from the one of the web page. Including these scripts complicates
analysis since the JavaScript content can change without any corresponding change in
the extension. We have observed changes to JavaScript files that substantially alter the
functionality of an extension, possibly due to a server compromise.
Network Level
By monitoring network requests, including DNS lookups and HTTP requests, we identify
other types of suspicious/malicious behavior. Using a manual analysis of network logs
we have identified two attributes that indicate malicious or suspicious behavior: request
errors and modification of HTTP requests. To detect HTTP modifications, we examine if
the network response that we observe on the wire differs from the network response finally
processed by the browser.
As we discussed earlier, the extension API offers callbacks to give extensions the ability
to intercept and manipulate web requests. Not only can extensions drop security-related
headers, but extensions can change or add parameters in URLs before the HTTP request is
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sent. We find such suspicious behavior common, especially among extensions that request
permissions on shopping-related sites such as Amazon, EBay, and others. In these cases, the
extension adds parameters to the URL that indicate that the site should credit a particular
affiliate for any resulting sales. We discuss this behavior in more detail in Section 5.4. At
the network level, we have the complete view of how the requests originally appeared. We
combine that knowledge with our chrome.*API monitoring to identify the exact changes
made to the request.
We also look for errors during domain name resolution to identify extensions that contact
domains since taken down. As with drive-by downloads, we expect that malicious code
dynamically loaded into an extension will eventually become blacklisted. In such cases, the
extension will fail to introduce more code during its execution. We detect this behavior and
mark it as suspicious.
5.2.4 Injected Content Analysis
A Chrome extension can also manipulate the visited pages of the browser by injecting a
content script. The injected script runs in the context of the visited page and thus has full
access to its DOM tree. The injected code can vary significantly, and, with the dynamic
nature of JavaScript, can prove difficult to analyze statically. The use of HoneyPages enables
us to understand the injected code’s full intentions. Instead of trying to infer what the code
will do, we actually run it to observe its effects on the DOM tree and classify it accordingly.
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Analysis result Count
Malicious 130
Suspicious 4,712
Benign 43,490
Total 48,332
Table 5.1: Classification distribution of extensions.
For example, if the injected code looks for a form field with the name “password,” we
classify it as malicious, since it can potentially hijack the user’s credentials on the page.
Another example concerns injecting additional code, where the injected code is part of a
two-stage process that fetches yet more code from the web and dynamically executes it in the
context of the visited page. By relying on HoneyPages to understand the code’s intentions
by the effect that the code has on a given page, we obtain a more precise view of what the
code attempts do than we can using only static analysis.
5.3 Results
To evaluate Hulk we use two sources of extensions: the official Chrome Web Store (totaling
47,940 extensions), and extensions sideloaded by binaries. We obtained the latter based on
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Detection class Count
[s] Injects dynamic JavaScript 2,672
[s] Produces HTTP 4xx errors 2,322
[s] Evals with input>128 chars long 451
[m] Prevents extension uninstall 56
[m] Steals password from form 39
[s] Performs requests to non-existent domain 26
[m] Contains keylogging functionality 23
[m] Injects security-related HTTP header 11
[m] Steals email address from form 10
[m] Uninstalls extensions 8
Table 5.2: Distribution of detected suspicious/malicious behavior from analyzed extensions.
Notice that an extension might have more than one detections and that we mark with [m]
detections classified as malicious and with [s] detections classified as suspicious.
binaries executed in Anubis [6], which, after removing a large number of duplicates, resulted
in a set of 392 unique extensions. As shown in Table 5.1, in total we analyzed 48,332 distinct
extensions, of which Hulk labeled 130 as malicious and 4,712 as suspicious. Table 5.2
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Rank Top 10 types of permissions # ext.
1 tabs 16,787
2 notifications 12,011
3 unlimitedStorage 9,424
4 storage 5,725
5 contextMenus 4,774
6 cookies 2,872
7 webRequest 2,849
8 webRequestBlocking 2,102
9 webNavigation 1,623
10 management 1,533
Table 5.3: The top 10 permissions found in the manifest files for all extensions we ran.
Extensions can include more than one permission.
summarizes all of the detected behaviors, which we analyze in more detail in the following
sections.
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5.3.1 Permissions Used
In this section we characterize the extensions we executed by identifying the most popular
permissions, content scripts, and API calls that they performed.
Permissions. Table 5.3 shows the top 10 permissions from 30,392 unique extensions
that use the Chrome Extension API (excluding the host permissions). The most com-
monly used, the tabs permission, allows an extension to interact with the browser’s
tabs, including navigating a tab to a specified URL and registering callbacks to react to
changes in the address bar. The second most popular permission, notifications,
allows an extension to generate custom notifications that alert the user. The storage and
unlimitedStorage permissions allow storing of permanent data in the user’s browser.
ThecontextMenus permission allows an extension to add additional items on the context
menu of the browser. Context menus appear when the user right clicks on a page. To manip-
ulate the browser’s cookies, an extension needs to ask for the cookies permission. The
permissions webRequest, webRequestBlocking and webNavigation allow
an extension to inspect, intercept, block, or modify web requests from the browser. Finally,
an extension can get a list of other extensions installed in the browser—and even disable or
unistall them—with the management permission.
We also computed permission statistics independently for the set of benign extensions and
the set of malicious or suspicious ones. To our surprise, we found that permissions for benign
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extensions do not differ significantly from permissions requested by malicious/suspicious
ones, indicating that often attackers do not need to target different APIs to perform their
attacks; maliciousness instead manifests in the way they use the API.
We found 18,313 extensions that use host permissions to restrict on which pages the
extension can use the privilegedchrome.*API. Table 5.4 shows the top 25 hosts appearing
in host permissions. As seen in the table, extensions typically request broad permissions using
wildcards in URL patterns. In addition these, we examined the hosts that extensions specified
as targets for injecting content scripts, per Table 5.5, finding similar broad declarations. In
practice, extension authors often use content scripts and host permissions in an unrestricted
fashion.
API calls. Table 5.6 shows the top 15 Chrome Extension API calls made during by
extensions during our experiments. There are several measurement artifacts introduced
by our methodology. To load an extension for testing, we install the extension on a
clean browser each time we start an analysis. This causes runtime.onInstalled
to appear in every analysis independent of the extension’s activities. We also open the
chrome://extensions tab from inside the extension to determine if the extension
interferes with the management of extensions. This causes Hulk to record a large number
of tabs.create calls. In Table 5.6 the tabs API is by far the most used API, which
matches the popularity of tabs permissions observed in Table 5.3.
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5.3.2 Network Level
Using network activity alone we identified 24 malicious extensions. These extensions were
labeled as malicious by Hulk because they tampered with security-related HTTP headers.
By removing HTTP response headers like Content-Security-Policy, the malicious extensions
can inject JavaScript into pages that specifically do not allow scripts from external sources
(according to the CSP policies provided by the web server). For example, Hulk found
multiple variants of an active extension on the Chrome Web Store targeting users that seek to
cheat in online games; these extensions, generally going by the name “Cheat in your favorite
games”, affect over 20K users.
During our experiments we encountered cases where our analysis could not obtain the full
set of information needed to make a decision regarding the maliciousness of an analyzed
extension. This problem arose due extensions performing HTTP requests that either returned
errors, such as an HTTP 404 responses, or having domain names that no longer resolved. In
such cases, given our inability to exercise the extension’s full set of capabilities, and because
the failed requests might correspond to fetching additional code, we mark these extensions
as suspicious.
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5.3.3 Extensions Management
Using signals tailored to detect the manipulation of the chrome://extensions page
(as described in Section 5.2.3), we found several extensions on the Chrome Web Store that
prevent uninstallation. Two of of these extensions claim to be video players (each with
thousands of user) and completely replace Chrome’s extensions management with a page
that prevents users from uninstalling them. These are “HD Video Player” with 7,173 users
and “SmartScreen Video Plugin” with 11,012 users. These signals also generated a false
positive: the “No Tab Left Behind” extension (with only 8 users) allows only one tab at a
time to be open. Thus, during our execution this extension prevented us from opening the
extension settings tab.
5.3.4 Code Injection
Code injection was the most commonly detected “suspicious” feature in our dataset. In
principle injection need not occur at all, since Chrome extensions can come packaged with all
the code needed to operate. In total, we found more than 3,000 extensions that dynamically
introduced remotely-retrieved code either through script injections or by evoking eval.
As we noted earlier, using remote code renders static analysis on the extension’s code
fundamentally incomplete. However, Hulk can identify code injections and pinpoint the
remote locations from which an extension fetches code. Although not necessarily malicious,
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we found many cases of dangerous code injection. For example, our system identified
an extension named “Bang5TaoShopping assistant” from the Chrome Web Store that has
been installed in 5.6 million (!) browsers and injects code into every visited page. Several
extensions perform this same activity, while others insert tracking pixels for similar purposes.
One instance sends cleartext HTTP request to a server controlled by the extension that
encodes the URL visited by the user along with a unique identifier, leaking users browsing
behavior and thus compromising their privacy.
5.4 Profiting from Maliciousness
In this section, we discuss five categories of malicious behavior in extensions, and describe
their characteristics and the methods they employ to carry out their goals. We base each of
these categories on examples we found in our feeds. When the extension is available on the
Chrome Web Store, we also when possible include the number of users prior to reporting the
extension to Google for review.
We have reported to Google any extension that performs behavior that is clearly abusive or
malicious, and several of our reports have lead to removals of extensions from the web store.
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5.4.1 Ad Manipulation
Advertisement manipulation falls in a grey area in that it does not subvert the user, but
rather manipulates an external ecosystem. Replacing ads might appear benign to end users,
but removes the potential for monetary credit for website owners (publishers) and instead
fraudulently credits the extension owner. We include in this category the addition of new
ads as well as the replacement of existing ads or identifiers. We find a range of behaviors in
extensions, such as replacing banner ads with different identically-sized banners; inserting
banners and text ads into well-known sites (such as Wikipedia); changing affiliate IDs
for ads; or simply overlaying ads on top of content. Each instance aims to profit from
impressions or clicks on the substituted advertisements.
As one striking example of ad manipulation we found an extension on the Chrome Web
Store that had 1.8M users at the time we detected it. The extension, named “SimilarSites
Pro” used primarily unobfuscated JS to perform benign functionality as advertised on the
Chrome Web Store; however, it also inserted a script element into the content of web pages
that downloads another, fully-obfuscated script (using eval and unescape) from a web
server. At the time of analysis, this script contained a large conditional block that looked for
iframe elements of particular sizes, such as 728x90 pixels, and replaced them with new
banners of the same size. Since our first analysis, we have seen several new versions of the
script available from the same URL. In addition, the extension contains a blacklist of sites
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"content_scripts": [{
"matches": ["http://*/*", "https://*/*"],
"js": ["js/content.js"]
}],
"permissions": ["http://*/*",
"https://*/*", "tabs"],
Figure 5.2: Permission-related JSON from the manifest file of an extension performing ad
replacement.
and meta keywords where it should not change the banners, which appears due to many ad
networks prohibiting the display of their ads on porn sites.
We find the same JavaScript included in five other extensions from the Chrome Web
Store, as well as one sideloaded extension. Based on manual analysis, these extensions are
primarily produced by a single company called “SimilarGroup” that engages in dubious
behavior through the Chrome Web Store.
To perform banner replacement, the extension requests the permissions shown in Fig-
ure 5.2. Such exceptionally wide permissions are not uncommon [15]. Therefore, their
presence alone provides little insight into the functionality of the extension. The most
significant permission in Figure 5.2 is the broad use of content scripts that allow the extension
to inject dynamic JavaScript files from a remote location. Following injection, execution
continues as though the page had included it. Such content scripts provide an exceptionally
powerful feature to enable a variety of malicious behaviors, as further discussed in this
Section.
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5.4.2 Affiliate Fraud
Many major merchant web sites such asamazon.com,godaddy.com, andebay.com
run affiliate programs that credit affiliates with a fraction of the sales made as a result of
customers referred by the affiliates. Usually merchant programs assign unique identifiers to
affiliates, which affiliates then include in the URL that refers customers to the merchant site.
Furthermore, affiliate programs usually associate a cookie with the user’s browser so that
they can attribute a sale to an affiliate within several hours after a user originally visited the
merchant site with an affiliate identifier.
As an example, when a user reads product reviews on an Amazon affiliate’s blog and
clicks on a link to Amazon, the link includes an Amazon affiliate ID specified with the
tagparameter in the URL, such ashttp://www.amazon.com/dp/0961825170/
?tag=affiliateID. When Amazon receives this request, it returns a Set-Cookie
header with a cookie that associates the user with the affiliate. When the customer returns to
Amazon within 24 hours and makes a purchase, Amazon credits the affiliate with a small
percentage of the transaction amount.
Such programs expect affiliates to bring potential customers to their sites via affiliate pages
that advertise the merchant products. However, we found examples of several extensions
involved in cookie stuffing—a technique that causes the user’s browser to visit the merchant
URLs without the user clicking on affiliate URLs. Doing so causes the merchant to deliver
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a cookie associated with the fraudulent affiliate, who then receives credit for any future,
unrelated purchase made by the customer on the merchant site. Besides defrauding the
merchant, the fraudulent affiliate also causes an over-write of the cookie associated with any
legitimate affiliate who might have genuinely influenced the user to buy the product.
In our study, we found two kinds of extensions that defrauded affiliate programs. The
first group includes extensions that provide some utility to users—such as refreshing pages
automatically every few seconds, or changing the theme of popular sites like Facebook—but
do not inform users of the extension author profiting from the user’s web browsing. Generally,
these activities involve monitoring visited URLs for merchant sites where the extension can
earn a commission and modifying the outgoing requested URLs to include the affiliate ID,
or by injecting iframe’s that include affiliate URLs.
For example, we found an extension named “*Split Screen*” (with 52K users) that
allows users to show two tabs in a single window, while also stealthily monitoring the
URLs visited by the user. It then silently replaces the requested URL with the affili-
ate’s URL for sites such as amazon.com, amazon.co.uk, hotelscombing.com,
hostgator.com, godaddy.com, and booking.com. For some merchants, it also
sets the referrer header for outgoing requests to falsely imply a visit through the affiliate’s site.
The extension is able to make these changes using tab and webRequest permissions,
as well as by registering callbacks on chrome.tabs.onUpdated to identify changes
in the URL as a user types, and chrome.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders
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to modify the referrer header before the browser sends a request to a merchant site. We
found four other extensions created by the same developer that similarly provided some
small utility to the user while defrauding merchant programs in the background. Overall this
developer’s extensions have nearly 70K users.
Another extension we found named “Facebook Theme: Basic Minimalist Black Theme”
(2.5K users) allows users to change the appearance of Facebook. Besides its stated intent,
however, it also monitors browsing and appends an affiliate identifier to 7 different Amazon
sites. By using its Content Security Policy (Section 5.1.3) to perform eval, it runs a highly-
obfuscated hexadecimal and base64-encoded background script that stores all affiliate
identifiers in Chrome’s storage (using storage permissions), and registers callbacks on
tab update events using tab permissions. When the user visits any URL, Chrome notifies
the extension, and the extension uses regular expressions to identify target Amazon URLs for
which to add an affiliate identifier. The extension then updates the URL before the browser
sends the request. The creator of the extension appears well aware that the extension violates
Amazon’s Conditions of Use [5] and has heavily used obfuscation, evidently to evade any
static analysis for detecting affiliate fraud.
As another example, we found an extension named “Page Refresh” (200 installations)
that allows users to refresh tabs periodically and only requests tabs permission. By using
the background page to listen on all tab update events, if a user visits a merchant site it sets
the URL in the tab to a URL shortener that redirects the user to the same merchant page but
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with the affiliate identifier included in the URL, thereby stuffing a cookie into the user’s
browser. This extension abuses 40 different merchants, again including Amazon.
This approach has the advantage that it capitalizes on organic traffic to merchant sites,
which can make fraud detection difficult because merchants see visit behavior highly similar
to that they would otherwise see as a result of legitimate affiliate referrals.
The second group of extensions includes extensions that clearly state in their descriptions
that the extension monetizes the user’s online purchases—generally for charitable causes
or donations to organizations. The intent or legitimacy of such programs is difficult to
ascertain. For example, the extension “Give as you Live” [17] has over 11K users, and forms
part of a larger campaign [16] to raise funds for charities from user purchases online. The
extension works by adding a list of stores for which the extension author has signed up as an
affiliate to the results of major search engines. It also adds a script on merchant sites such
as amazon.co.uk to redirect users via its own URL. While it does bring legitimate and
likely well-intentioned traffic to Amazon, the legitimate affiliates can lose out if users choose
to read product reviews on affiliate sites and then make the purchase via this extension.
In fact, a plethora of extensions exists allowing users to donate to charity simply by
shopping online. Another such extension uses webRequest permissions to modify the
requested URL to the affiliate URL, including over-writing the existing affiliate URL. While
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this clearly constitutes cookie-stuffing, the extension advertises itself as “Help support our
charity by shopping at amazon.co.uk”.3
5.4.3 Information Theft
Information theft clearly reflects malicious behavior that has the potential to harm the user
in a number of ways, from disclosing private information to financial loss. This broad
category of abuse in many ways replicates the functionality of some malware families.
Within the browser, we observe stealing of: keypresses, passwords and form data, private
in-page content (e.g., bank balances), and authentication tokens such as cookies. We do not
include extensions that simply re-use existing authentication tokens already present, such as
extensions that spam on social networks; we discuss these in Section 5.4.4.
One example of keylogging we found in the Chrome Web Store, “Chrome Keylogger”,
is an experimental extension from researchers [35] that is now removed. Keyloggers use
content scripts to register callbacks for key press events, recording the pressed key by
using the messaging API to communicate with a background page. The background page
then queues up data to send to a remote server. This behavior has similarities with that of
extensions that steal form data, although the specific event handlers differ. Both form field
theft and keylogging require the extension to specify a content script but do not require other
permissions.
3 The extension creator also helpfully marked the JavaScript code that adds the affiliate identifier as
something to obfuscate in the future.
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5.4.4 OSN Abuse
Online social network abuse constitutes the final category of prevalent malicious extensions
we found. These extensions typically target Facebook, and spread via both the Chrome Web
Store and sideloading. These extensions use existing authentication data to interact with
the APIs and websites of online social networks. Previous work identified and reported
Chrome extensions that abuse social networks, reporting that thousands of users had installed
extensions from the Chrome Web Store that spam on Facebook [7].
We found a number of extensions that post spam messages and use other features provided
by social networks, such as the ability to upload and comment on photos or query the
social graph. When we execute these extensions with Hulk, the HoneyPage features allows
the extensions to create elements and insert them into the DOM tree. While we do not
typically inspect the visual results of our executions, in one case we observed an extension
creating div elements to mimic Facebook status updates and inserting them into a page.
The HoneyPage acted as a sink for the spam status messages resulting in a page full of spam
for the infected user.
One extension of interest, WhasApp (a name closely resembling the popular WhatsApp, a
mobile chat application), has since been removed from the Chrome Web Store, but we also
found evidence of the same extension being sideloaded from malware. The extension targets
both Facebook and Tumblr. At Facebook, the extension uploads images to Facebook and
130
Chapter 5. ElicitingMalicious Behavior in Browser Extensions
"content_scripts": [{
"js":["BlobBuilder.js", ... ],
"matches":["http://*/*", "https://*/*" ],
"run_at": "document_end"
}],
"permissions":["http://*/*", "https://*/*",
"*://*.facebook.com/",
"tabs", "cookies", "notifications",
"contextMenus", "webRequest", ...],
Figure 5.3: Permissions and content script excerpts from the manifest for an extension that
spams on Facebook and creates Tumblr accounts.
then comments on them with messages containing URLs. In some cases the links are used to
spread the malicious extension to a wider audience, while other URLs sought to monetize
users as part of a spam campaign to advertise products. At Tumblr, the extension creates new
Tumblr accounts and verifies them in the background.
The manifest file contains permissions and content scripts that request broad access,
as shown in Figure 5.3. The extension is in fact over-privileged, since the extension in
fact does not use some of the API permissions the manifest includes. Prior work has
identified over-privileging as not uncommon, even among benign extensions [28]. Figure 5.3
shows the extension specifically requesting access for permissions and content scripts on
facebook.com in addition to all other sites, which provides a hint as to the sites targeted.
To carry out spamming on Facebook and Tumblr account creation, the extension actually
only requires the use of content scripts. The abusive component of the extension is 15 lines
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of JavaScript that downloads a much larger remote JavaScript file containing the spamming
functionality.
5.5 Recommendations
In this section, we frame changes to make Chrome’s extension ecosystem safer. Ex-
tensions should not have the ability to manipulate browser configuration pages, such as
chrome://extensions, that govern how users manage and uninstall extensions. Ex-
tensions should also not be allowed to uninstall other extensions unless they are from the
same author or a trusted source (such as Google or Antivirus vendors). We also recommend
preventing extensions from manipulating HTTP requests by removing security-related
headers that compromise the security of web pages. This change will require modifications
to several extension APIs to comprehensively address this issue, the primary one being
webRequest.
To address cloaking and other changes in remotely included content, we suggest that
Google should encourage local inclusion of static files in the context of a web page.
Chrome supports pushing automatic updates of extensions to users, so remotely including
additional JavaScript code is not necessary to support rapid changes in an extenion’s code.
This change will make it possible to have a more complete analysis of extension behavior,
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since the analysis engine—Hulk or otherwise4—will have the complete extension code
available. To encourage developers to write completely self-contained extensions and not
load additional code from the network, one could introduce a new policies, such as: if an
extension loads code from a remote site, it loses permissions such as the ability to inject that
new code into the visited pages.
Finally, extensions should not have the ability to hook all keyboard events on a given
site. The window.onkey* API that exists in JavaScript has utility for pages that want to
intercept the keyboard events of their users, but in the context of extensions it provides too
much power. An experimental API (chrome.commands) exists that allows extensions to
register keyboard shortcuts; this strikes us as a step in the right direction, as this covers the
common use-case for requiring access to these events.
These suggestions will not eliminate malicious extensions, but can prevent classes of
attacks, and significantly facilitate the analysis of extensions.
5.6 Limitations
Our system uses dynamic analysis for analyzing extensions, and, as with every dynamic
analysis system, the correct classification of an extension relies on triggering the malicious
activity. Hulk employs HoneyPages and event handler fuzzing on the extension’s web
4 In particular, ultimately an extension store operator such as Google needs to undertake such analysis as
part of its curation of the store contents.
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request listeners to enhance dynamic analysis, but does not provide a complete view of
extension behavior. For example, we do not attempt to address cloaking that loads different
code based on the client’s location or time. We also will not observe behavior that depends
on specific targets, such as those that require user interaction with a visited page to take
effect. Similarly, pages that require sign-in pose difficulties. Hulk has a pre-set list of sites
and credentials to use while visiting pages, but does not perform account creation on the fly.
Hulk’s Honeypages do not currently support multi-step querying of DOM elements.
While we can place elements in the DOM tree that an extension looks for, if the extension
expects elements to have additional properties in order to trigger its malicious behavior, we
will fail to adapt to the extension’s expectations. We plan on improving HoneyPages to
support multi-step querying, and for many element types and attributes this appears possible.
We currently also lack data flow analysis in the Chrome browser, a feature that would
substantially improve the depth of behavior available for analysis. One example where this
would prove particular useful regards keystroke interception. Without data flow tracking, we
cannot automatically derive whether this information ultimately becomes transmitted to a
third party via a network request.
Another difficult concern for Hulk is analysis evasion by extensions that specifically look
for HoneyPages. A determined adversary with knowledge of the system could try to evade
Hulk by querying for random elements in the DOM tree first, and, if found, avoid malicious
activity. A similar type of evasive behavior arose for in submissions to Wepawet [49]. One
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way to counter this is by introducing non-deterministic HoneyPages for which DOM tree
queries only succeed with a given probability. We could further enhance this approach
by crawling a few million sites and building models of the existing elements to assign apt
probabilities weights for different queries. This approach may also require analysis of an
extension’s DOM queries in case the extension repeatedly performs these in an effort to
detect randomized queries. Finally, we can consider measuring code coverage to examine
the impact that each DOM query has on the amount of code executed by an extension, as the
extension will skip executing the malicious code when it detects the presence of an analysis
system.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented Hulk, a system to dynamically analyze Chrome browser
extensions and identify malicious behavior. Our system monitors an extension’s actions
and creates a dynamic environment that adapts to an extension’s needs in order to trigger
the intended behavior of extensions, classifying the extension as malicious or benign
accordingly. In total, we identified 130 malicious and 4,712 suspicious extensions that have
up to 5.5 million browser installations, many of which remain live in the Chrome Web Store.
Based on these results, we developed a detailed characterization of the malicious behavior
that we found, targeted at determining the motivation behind the extension. Finally, we
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propose several changes for the Chrome browser ecosystem that could eliminate classes of
extension-based attacks and aid with analysis.
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Rank Top 25 hosts in permissions # ext.
1 http://*/* 7,319
2 https://*/* 6,395
3 <all urls> 2,044
4 http://*/ 1,126
5 *://*/* 1,025
6 https://*/ 665
7 www.flashgame90.com/Default.aspx 224
8 https://api.twitter.com/ 200
9 http://localhost/* 161
10 http://127.0.0.1/* 133
11 https://secure.flickr.com/ 95
12 *://*.facebook.com/* 91
13 *://*/ 89
14 https://www.facebook.com/* 82
15 http://vk.com/* 77
16 http://*.facebook.com/* 77
17 https://mail.google.com/* 71
18 https://*.facebook.com/* 70
19 http://*.google.com/ 68
20 https://www.google-analytics.com/ 67
21 https://mail.google.com/ 64
22 https://*.google.com/ 62
23 https://twitter.com/* 61
24 https://www.googleapis.com/ 60
25 google.com/accounts/OAuthGetAcc[..] 56
Table 5.4: The top 25 host permissions used by extensions. Extensions can include more
than one host permission per manifest.
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Rank Top 25 hosts in content scripts # ext.
1 http://*/* 12,472
2 https://*/* 10,864
3 <all urls> 4,795
4 *://*/* 1,536
5 https://www.facebook.com/* 520
6 *://*.facebook.com/* 510
7 https://mail.google.com/* 458
8 http://www.facebook.com/* 433
9 https://*.facebook.com/* 344
10 http://*.facebook.com/* 320
11 file://*/* 315
12 https://twitter.com/* 303
13 http://mail.google.com/* 273
14 *://pages.brandthunder.com/[..] 265
15 https://plus.google.com/* 261
16 ftp://*/* 246
17 http://vk.com/* 227
18 http://www.youtube.com/* 211
19 file:///* 207
20 *://mail.google.com/* 189
21 http://twitter.com/* 179
22 *://www.facebook.com/* 178
23 http://ak.imgfarm.com/images[..] 177
24 *://*.reddit.com/* 164
25 https://vk.com/* 164
Table 5.5: The top 25 hosts used in extensions’ content script permissions.
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Rank Top 15 chrome.* APIs called # calls
1 runtime.onInstalled 182,476
2 webRequestInternal.eventHandled 57,466
3 tabs.getAllInWindow 49,312
4 tabs.onUpdated 32,354
5 tabs.create 25,947
6 i18n.getMessage 13,549
7 webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders 13,213
8 runtime.connect 13,004
9 extension.getURL 11,942
10 storage.get 10,178
11 contextMenus.create 7,816
12 tabs.get 6,970
13 webRequest.onBeforeRequest 6,168
14 runtime.sendMessage 5,847
15 extension.sendRequest 5,454
Table 5.6: The top 15 chrome.* APIs called by extensions during dynamic analysis.
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Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, I have analyzed continuously-changing web threats that target the
browser and have shown several novel techniques to defend against them. I have described
how the attackers can use sophisticated ways to evade the state-of-the-art detection systems
that exist. To deal with such evasive attempts, I have developed a system that tracks the
evolution of attacks, leading to better detection of such threats. I have also showed how we
can deal with emerging threats against the browser, such as malicious browser extensions,
by building a system that dynamically analyzes them and pinpoints their malicious behavior.
The extensions identified as malicious by our system were reported to Google and removed
from Chrome’s Web Store, affecting millions of users that had them installed.
In the future, I plan to continue working on improving the browser’s security and making
the Internet a safer place. As attacks become more sophisticated and more targeted, we will
need to devise new techniques to eliminate them. I plan to change the way we deal with
browser and Internet attacks by introducing a novel analysis model that is integrated into the
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browser. This way we will eliminate evasions completely, as the user’s system is the one that
will analyze the attacking code. By moving the analysis inside the browser we will be able to
detect targeted attacks, which was previously not possible by older analysis systems, as only
a tiny fraction of web clients observe targeted attacks. In a nutshell, my ultimate goal is to
protect all Internet users so that everybody can safely browse the web.
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